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MARK P. NEVITT & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL 
ABSTRACT 
The Trump Administration is rapidly turning the clock back on climate 
policy and environmental regulation. Despite overwhelming, peer-
reviewed scientific evidence, administration officials eager to promote 
greater use of fossil fuels are disregarding climate science. This Article 
argues that this massive and historic deregulation may spawn yet another 
wave of legal innovation as litigants, including states and their political 
subdivisions, return to the common law to protect the health of the planet. 
Prior to the emergence of the major federal environmental laws in the 
1970s, the common law of nuisance gave rise to the earliest environmental 
decisions in U.S. history. In some of these cases, the Supreme Court issued 
injunctions to control significant sources of air and water pollution, but 
the Court later held that the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act displaced 
the federal common law of nuisance. 
This Article argues that official climate denial may yet revive the 
common law as a regulatory backstop. If the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency reverses its earlier endangerment finding for 
greenhouse gas emissions, the Clean Air Act may no longer displace the 
federal common law of nuisance. While expert administrative agencies 
normally are more competent than the judiciary in fashioning regulatory 
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policy, agencies that deny climate science should expect to face judicial 
intervention. As described in this Article, such action is consistent with the 
historic role the judiciary has played when other branches of government 
failed to prevent significant environmental harm. 
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“Global warming may be a ‘crisis,’ even ‘the most pressing 
environmental problem of our time.’ Indeed, it may ultimately affect 
nearly everyone on the planet in some potentially adverse way, and it may 
be that governments have done too little to address it. It is not a problem, 
however, that has escaped the attention of policymakers in the Executive 
and Legislative Branches of our Government, who continue to consider 
regulatory, legislative, and treaty-based means of addressing global 
climate change.” 
 
— Chief Justice John Roberts, dissenting in Massachusetts v. 
EPA (2007)1 
 
 “The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in 
order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.” 
 
— Donald J. Trump, Nov. 6, 20122 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the advent of comprehensive regulatory programs to protect the 
environment, the common law served as the primary vehicle for redressing 
environmental harm. More than a century ago, states used the common 
law of interstate nuisance to seek redress for the most serious 
transboundary pollution problems.3 Exercising its original jurisdiction over 
disputes between states, the U.S. Supreme Court issued injunctions 
                                                      
1. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted).  
2. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:15 AM), https://twitter 
.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en [http://perma.cc/XN5S-TLQ6]. 
3. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 
(1906). 
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limiting smelter emissions4 and requiring cities to build sewage treatment 
plants5 and garbage incinerators.6  
Today the common law has been eclipsed by the enactment of federal 
legislation requiring agencies to regulate sources of pollution. These 
statutes have been interpreted broadly to give agencies great power to 
respond to emerging problems. For example, in Massachusetts v. EPA the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the Clean Air Act (CAA) gives the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to regulate 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions if they “endanger public health or 
welfare”7 by contributing to global warming and climate change.8 The 
Court rejected not only the claim that EPA lacked such authority, but also 
the agency’s other rationales for refusing to take action.9 Following the 
ruling, EPA had to decide “whether sufficient information exist[ed] to 
make an endangerment finding.”10 It made the endangerment finding two 
years later.11  
In a series of cases beginning in the 1970s, the Court has held that the 
comprehensive regulatory programs erected by the Clean Water Act 
(CWA) and the CAA displace federal common law nuisance claims.12 
When states sought to use public nuisance law to address the threats posed 
by climate change, industry groups urged the Court to bar such actions on 
constitutional grounds.13 Instead, in June 2011 the Court held in American 
Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut (AEP) that the CAA displaced 
federal common law nuisance claims in the context of regulating GHG 
emissions. At the time of the ruling, the Obama Administration EPA was 
moving aggressively to regulate GHG emissions. But, writing for a 
unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg warned that a decision by the EPA not 
                                                      
4. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915). 
5. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929). 
6. New Jersey v. New York City, 290 U.S. 237 (1933). 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(3)(D) (2012). 
8. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007). 
9. Id. at 528–34. 
10. Id. at 534. 
11. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,495 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
12. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (holding that the CAA displaced 
the federal common law of interstate nuisance for regulating GHG emissions); City of Milwaukee v. 
Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that the CWA displaced the federal common law 
of interstate nuisance). But the Court also made clear that federal environmental laws do not 
necessarily preempt state common law nuisance claims. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 
(1987) (holding that state law is not preempted as long as the law of the source state is applied). In 
American Electric Power Co., the Court expressly reserved the question whether the CAA preempted 
state common law nuisance claims. 564 U.S. at 429. 
13. See infra Part I.B. 
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to regulate greenhouse gas emissions would invite litigation and would be 
subject to judicial review.14  
With the election of President Trump, federal environmental policy has 
sharply shifted. The President has announced his intent to withdraw the 
U.S. from the Paris Agreement that every other country in the world has 
accepted as a global response to climate change.15 EPA is moving 
aggressively to repeal the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan,16 
roll back Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, and 
attempt to preempt state programs to reduce GHG emissions.17 Many 
Trump supporters want EPA to reverse its finding that GHG emissions 
endanger public health and welfare by contributing to climate change.18 
If the Trump EPA reverses the 2009 endangerment finding, this would 
foreclose the EPA’s ability to use the CAA to regulate GHG emissions. 
This Article considers whether such an action unwittingly could revive the 
federal common law of nuisance as a regulatory backstop. While the 
Supreme Court ruled in AEP that the CAA displaces any federal common 
law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil fuel-
fired power plants, this was predicated on EPA actually making a reasoned 
and informed judgment of GHG emission dangers—not jettisoning agency 
expertise in favor of politics.19 This litigation, particularly if brought by 
                                                      
14. AEP, 564 U.S. at 426–27 (“EPA’s judgment, we hasten to add, would not escape judicial 
review. . . . If the plaintiffs in this case are dissatisfied with the outcome of EPA’s forthcoming 
rulemaking, their recourse under federal law is to seek [judicial] review, and, ultimately, to petition for 
certiorari in this Court.”).  
15. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 2017), https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/ [https://perma.c 
c/J4D7-7V2G]. 
16. See Eric Lipton, President’s Rush to Deregulate Meets an Obstacle: The Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2017 at A1. Administrator Pruitt moved swiftly to roll back Obama-era Clean Power 
Plan rules. See, e.g., Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Tells Coal Miners He Will 
Repeal Power Plant Rule Tuesday: ‘The War Against Coal is Over,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2017), https: 
//www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/10/09/pruitt-tells-coal-miners-he-will-
repeal-power-plan-rule-tuesday-the-war-on-coal-is-over/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b0739170e67f 
[https://perma.cc/MJ86-65KL]. His successor has continued to do so. See infra note 17. 
17. On August 21, 2018, EPA Acting Administrator Andrew Wheeler proposed the 
“Affordable Clean Energy Rule” that seeks to replace the Clean Power Plan. 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746 
(Aug. 31, 2018); Press Release, EPA, EPA Proposes Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule (Aug. 21, 
2018), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-proposes-affordable-clean-energy-ace-rule [https://perm 
a.cc/AKD4-F5DT]. Mark Hand, Widespread Disapproval Greets Trump’s Rollback of Auto Emissions 
and Fuel Efficiency Standards, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 2, 2018, 10:28 AM), https://thinkprogress.org/ 
widespread-disapproval-greets-trumps-rollback-of-auto-emissions-and-fuel-efficiency-standards-e5e6 
5a8a4607/ [https://per ma.cc/KT56-ARR5]. 
18. Tom DiChristopher, EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Won’t Rule out Repealing the Foundation of 
Obama-Era Climate Change Rules, CNBC (Jan. 30, 2018, 7:43 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/ 
30/epa-chief-scott-pruitt-wont-rule-out-repealing-endangerment-finding.html [https://perma.cc/4LMC-
M4TT]. 
19. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 324 (1981) (“The question [for purposes of displacement] 
is whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular manner.”). But 
this is predicated on some form of occupation; a refusal to occupy the field is an abdication of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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states as quasi-sovereigns against EPA, could serve as a powerful prod to 
force federal action on climate change. After all, states have the “last word 
as to whether [their] mountains shall be stripped of their forests and [their] 
inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”20 
In light of the Trump EPA’s current stance on environmental 
regulations, the Court’s decision in AEP, and other nuisance cases decided 
by federal appellate courts,21 this is a propitious time to reconsider the use 
of public nuisance law to redress environmental problems. This Article 
focuses on what we call “the common law of interstate nuisance”—a body 
of law developed when states, acting in a parens patriae capacity, sought 
to protect their citizens from environmental harm originating in other 
states through public nuisance actions under either federal or state 
common law.22  
This Article makes two core arguments. First, it maintains that the 
common law of nuisance remains an essential backstop when existing 
regulatory authorities fail to address significant environmental problems. 
Second, reconnecting nuisance law to its historical roots, the Article 
maintains that common law litigation has served as an effective prod to 
help spur the development and implementation of new pollution control 
technology and to stimulate regulatory action to require its use, rather than 
serving as a vehicle for the judiciary to impose its own solutions for 
environmental problems.23  
                                                                                                                         
responsibility. See AEP, 564 U.S. at 424 (reviewing the provisions of the CAA that require EPA to 
regulate emissions once a pollutant has been found to endanger public health or welfare).  
20. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
21. Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013); North Carolina ex rel. 
Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010); Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011). 
22. See Sara Zdeb, Note, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v. EPA: Parens 
Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintiffs, 96 GEO. L.J. 1059 (2008). State attorneys 
general also have sought to use public nuisance actions to recover damages from the manufacturers of 
tobacco products, firearms, and lead-based paint, see, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., Master 
Settlement Agreement, http://www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/msa-tobacco/MSA.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/RF79-88ZJ] (settlement of tobacco litigation); District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 872 
A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005) (firearms); City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 
1993) (lead-based paint), but these mass products liability cases are not addressed in this Article. The 
Article also does not consider private nuisance litigation, including cases brought by private parties to 
redress harm allegedly caused by climate change. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 
(5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting political question and lack of standing as grounds for dismissing lawsuit 
against oil companies for their contribution to climate change by victims of Hurricane Katrina who 
allege that climate change made the hurricane more severe), reh’g granted en banc, 598 F.3d 208 (5th 
Cir. 2010), reh’g dismissed en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (dismissing appeal for lack of 
quorum to transact judicial business due to disqualification of eight judges), mandamus denied, 562 
U.S. 1133 (2011).  
23. Cf. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era 
of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011). 
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the history of the 
common law of interstate nuisance from the early twentieth century 
through the rise of the modern regulatory state.24 Part II focuses on efforts 
to use this doctrine to control GHG emissions causing climate change, 
focusing on state efforts to require utilities operating coal-fired power 
plants to reduce their emissions. These efforts culminated in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in AEP v. Connecticut holding that the CAA displaces 
federal common law. Part III then considers why AEP does not eliminate 
common law as a regulatory backstop, as illustrated by the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision that it could be used to address problems not covered by 
existing regulatory statutes.25 Part IV then considers how official climate 
denial could revitalize the common law and return the judiciary to its 
historic role of responding when the other branches fail to address 
significant environmental harm.  
I. A HISTORY OF INTERSTATE NUISANCE LAW 
Although Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins held that there “is no federal 
general common law,”26 the Supreme Court has continually recognized 
that when dealing “with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, 
there is a federal common law . . . .”27 Beginning in 1901 and over a half-
century period prior to the modern environmental law movement that 
ushered in the modern federal environmental regulatory state, the Court 
recognized the right of states to bring common law nuisance actions to 
redress interstate pollution.28 These cases were brought directly to the U.S. 
Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction conferred by Article III, 
Section 2 of the Constitution governing disputes between states.29  
As noted above, the Court umpired interstate pollution disputes and 
issued injunctions limiting air and water pollution.30 In other cases the 
                                                      
24. One of the authors previously has reviewed in detail the history of the federal common law 
of nuisance for interstate water pollution disputes. See Robert V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and 
the Demise of the Federal Common Law of Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717 (2004).  
25. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011). 
26. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
27. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972) (emphasis added). 
28. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241–43 (1901). 
29. “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States . . . to Controversies between two or more States . . . 
.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The framers of the Constitution clearly contemplated that the Court would 
play an important role in resolving more than just boundary disputes between states. As Alexander 
Hamilton explained: “[T]here are many other sources, beside interfering claims of boundary, from 
which bickerings and animosities may spring up among the members of the Union. . . . Whatever 
practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States, are proper objects of federal 
superintendence and control.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 440 (Alexander Hamilton) (Colonial Press 
1901). 
30. See supra notes 4–6.  
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Court denied relief because it found that plaintiff states had failed to prove 
sufficient causal injury and/or were themselves engaged in similar 
polluting activities.31 At times the Court expressed discomfort umpiring 
interstate pollution disputes,32 but it acknowledged its unique authority to 
vindicate the interests of states in protecting their citizens from 
transboundary pollution.33 
Concerned about the fact-intensive and technical nature of such 
litigation, the Supreme Court eventually relegated interstate nuisance 
actions to the federal district courts.34 After efforts to persuade states to 
adopt effective regulatory programs failed, in the early 1970s Congress 
adopted comprehensive national regulatory legislation to protect air and 
water quality. These laws included the CWA and CAA. Following these 
major legislative achievements, the Supreme Court pulled back even 
further, ruling that both the CWA35 and CAA36 displace the federal 
common law of interstate nuisance. But state common law nuisance 
actions using the law of the source state remain viable as both a litigation 
tool and prod for action.37  
A. The Initial Public Nuisance Cases 
1. Missouri v. Illinois (1906): The First Interstate Nuisance Case 
Decided by the Supreme Court 
In the late nineteenth century and well before the passage of the CWA, 
most cities disposed of their sewage simply by dumping it untreated into 
nearby lakes or streams.38 Not surprisingly, this caused massive public 
health issues. At the turn of the twentieth century, Chicago’s widespread 
use of this practice spawned the first major interstate pollution dispute to 
reach the U.S. Supreme Court.39 Chicago disposed of its raw sewage by 
dumping it directly into the Chicago River, which flowed into Lake 
Michigan, the source of the city’s drinking water. Not surprisingly, the 
city suffered numerous health problems linked to contaminated drinking 
water including cholera epidemics and high death rates from typhoid 
                                                      
31. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
32. New York, 256 U.S. at 313. 
33. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901). 
34. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
35. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
36. AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
37. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
38. See Mayor of Newark v. Sayre, 45 A. 985, 988 (N.J. 1900) (“[F]rom time immemorial the 
right to connect [sewers] with navigable streams has been regarded as part of the jus publicum.”). 
39. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
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fever.40 To resolve the city’s sewage disposal problem, the state of Illinois 
approved construction of a canal to reverse the flow of the Chicago River 
to take the sewage away from Lake Michigan.41 By 1900 Chicago’s 
sewage was flowing down the Chicago River to the Des Plaines River, 
which drained into the Mississippi River.42 Because Missouri cities used 
the Mississippi as their source of drinking water, Missouri residents were 
alarmed.43 
The Supreme Court allowed Missouri’s attorney general to file a 
common law nuisance action against Illinois to enjoin Illinois and the 
Sanitary District of Chicago from discharging sewage through the canal.44 
In an initial ruling, Justice Shiras emphasized that “if the health and 
comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper 
party to represent and defend them,”45 and “that an adequate remedy can 
only be found in this court at the suit of the State of Missouri.”46 In doing 
so, Justice Shiras dismissed Illinois’s claim that individual private 
nuisance actions could be an adequate remedy for the harm Missouri 
alleged.47  
After five years of intensive fact gathering before a special 
commissioner, a unanimous Court ultimately denied the relief sought by 
Missouri in February 1906.48 Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes stated, “Before this court ought to intervene the case should be of 
serious magnitude, clearly and fully proved, and the principle to be applied 
should be one which the court is prepared deliberately to maintain against 
all considerations on the other side.”49 Holmes recognized that advances in 
scientific knowledge, such as acceptance of the germ theory of diseases, 
meant that nuisances could include even things that cannot “be detected by 
the unassisted senses.”50 But the Court ultimately held that Missouri had 
failed to prove sufficient causal injury: the experts for both sides were 
sharply split on whether Chicago sewage was capable of causing typhoid 
fever in St. Louis.51 Further undermining Missouri’s causal argument, 
there had not been an increase in typhoid cases in cities between St. Louis 
                                                      
40. Id. at 498; see also Chicago’s Quest for Pure Water, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 1900, at 9. 
41. Chicago’s Quest for Pure Water, supra note 40. 
42. Id.; Turn the River into Big Canal, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3, 1900, at 9. 
43. St. Louis Has Two Rebuffs, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 1900, at 5. 
44. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). 
45. Id. at 241. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
49. Id. at 521 (emphasis added). 
50. Id. at 522.  
51. Id. at 523. 
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and Chicago despite other cities disposing their raw sewage in the same 
river.52  
2. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper (1907): The Court Acknowledges 
States’ Special Status as Quasi-Sovereigns 
Just one year after it decided Missouri v. Illinois, the Supreme Court in 
1907 decided another prominent interstate public nuisance pollution 
dispute. This time the controversy involved Georgia’s claim that sulfur 
dioxide emissions from two copper smelters located just across the border 
in Tennessee had destroyed crops and other vegetation in northern 
Georgia.53 In October 1905 Georgia filed suit against the smelters in the 
U.S. Supreme Court.54 The smelter owners successfully convinced the 
Court not to grant preliminary relief to the state of Georgia.55 But the 
Court ordered that the case be tried on an expedited basis. After hearing 
two days of oral argument in February 1907, the Supreme Court released 
its decision on May 13, 1907.56 
In an opinion by Justice Holmes the Court declared that Georgia had 
established its right to obtain an injunction requiring abatement of 
emissions from the smelters.57 Holmes emphasized that this was not a 
lawsuit “between two private parties,” but instead “a suit by a State for an 
injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign.”58 Thus, he found it 
unnecessary for Georgia to establish that state-owned property had 
suffered significant harm because “the State has an interest independent of 
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its 
domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped 
of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”59  
Damages were not adequate to compensate Georgia, Holmes declared, 
because a state’s quasi-sovereign rights cannot be bought.60 Because a 
state’s sovereign right to protect its citizens against transboundary 
                                                      
52. Id. at 523–26. 
53. Three years before, in 1904, the Tennessee Supreme Court had heard a private nuisance 
action brought against the same smelters by nearby landowners. It had awarded modest damages to the 
plaintiffs, but it emphatically rejected the plaintiffs’ demands to require the smelters to abate their 
emissions in light of the great economic value of the enterprises. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, 
Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904). 
54. On Oct. 4, 1905, Georgia filed its motion for approval to file a bill of complaint, which was 
approved by the Supreme Court on October 23, 1905. Case files of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 
Orig. No. 5, U.S. National Archives, Record Group 267.3.3.  
55. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907).  
56. Id. at 230. 
57. Id. at 239.  
58. Id. at 237.  
59. Id. at 237. 
60. Id. at 237–38. 
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pollution was at stake, Holmes declared that the Court should be less 
inclined to give weight to the traditional factors relevant to the exercise of 
equitable discretion.61 Holmes declared: 
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the 
air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by 
sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains, be they better 
or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have suffered, 
should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons 
beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not 
be endangered from the same source.62  
Reviewing the evidence, Holmes found it clear that the vast quantities 
of pollution from the smelters “cause and threaten damage on so 
considerable a scale to the forests and vegetable life, if not to health, 
within the plaintiff State as to make out a case within the requirements of 
Missouri v. Illinois . . . .”63 Having upheld Georgia’s right to an injunction, 
Justice Holmes left it up to the state to decide if that was truly its preferred 
remedy.64 He concluded his opinion by stating: “If the State of Georgia 
adheres to its determination, there is no alternative to issuing an injunction 
. . . .”65 Rather than immediately issuing an injunction, the Court decided 
to allow “a reasonable time to the defendants to complete the structures 
that they now are building, and the efforts that they are making, to stop the 
fumes.”66  
While more than a “reasonable time” passed, a settlement was finally 
reached in February 1911 between the Tennessee Copper Company and 
the state of Georgia.67 However, the operator of the second smelter, the 
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Company, refused to settle. After even 
more hearings in the Supreme Court, the Court held in May 1915 that the 
Ducktown Company had not met its burden of proving that its emissions 
                                                      
61. Balancing of the traditional factors to be considered before granting equitable relief had 
been a focal point of the parties’ oral arguments. These factors included  
a comparison between the damage threatened to the plaintiff and the calamity of a possible 
stop to the defendants’ business, the question of health, the character of the forests as a first or 
second growth, the commercial possibility or impossibility of reducing the fumes to sulphuric 
acid, the special adaptation of the business to the place.  
Id. at 238. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 238–39. 
64. Id. at 239.  
65. Id.  
66. Id. at 239.  
67. The company agreed to cut back on sulphur emissions from the smelter during the growing 
season from May 20 to September 1. Additionally, two years later a compensation fund was created 
for victims in Northern Georgia. Case files of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., Orig. No. 5, U.S. 
National Archives, Record Group 267.3.3. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
452 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 96:441 
 
 
 
no longer were causing harm in Georgia.68 On June 1, 1915, the Court 
issued a decree directing the Ducktown Company to limit sulfur emissions 
to twenty tons per day from April 10 to October 1 and forty tons per day 
during the rest of year.69  
3. Sewage, Garbage & Water Diversion Conflicts Decided by the 
Court 
Sewage disposal problems precipitated another interstate nuisance 
dispute filed in the U.S. Supreme Court in 1908. The state of New York 
sued New Jersey in an effort to block construction of a tunnel that would 
channel New Jersey sewage discharges away from the heavily polluted 
Passaic River into Upper New York Bay.70 Justice John H. Clarke 
authored a unanimous decision holding that New York had not presented 
sufficient evidence to warrant issuance of an injunction.71 The Court 
acknowledged New York’s right to sue New Jersey, but it held that New 
York had not satisfied its burden of establishing a serious invasion of its 
rights “by clear and convincing evidence.”72 The Court also noted that the 
federal government had the right to stop New Jersey’s sewage discharges 
if they subsequently caused harm as a result of the settlement agreement, 
which Charles Evan Hughes (lawyer for New York) described as the 
reason for his defeat.73 In an unusual aside, Justice Clarke opined that such 
settlements were likely to effect better solutions to such disputes than any 
lawsuits.74 
In 1929 New Jersey turned the tables on New York by suing New York 
City for dumping its garbage in the ocean where it eventually would wash 
up on New Jersey beaches.75 This time the Court appointed a special 
master to hear testimony in the case.76 The special master found that New 
York City had caused enough garbage to wash upon New Jersey shores to 
fill fifty trucks, damaging fishnets and making swimming impracticable.77 
                                                      
68. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474, 476–77 (1915). 
69. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 678, 680 (1915). 
70. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 300 (1921). 
71. Id. at 309–10, 312–13. 
72. Id. at 309 (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906)). The Court emphasized that 
New York had failed to prove that there were visible suspended particles, odors, or a reduction in the 
dissolved oxygen content of the Bay sufficient to interfere with aquatic life. Id. at 310–11. 
73. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVAN HUGHES 194–95 (David J. Danelski & 
Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973). 
74. “We cannot withhold the suggestion,” that problems like the present case are “more likely 
to be wisely solved by co-operative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of . . . 
the States so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any court . . . .” 256 U.S. at 313.  
75. New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931). 
76. Id. at 477. 
77. Id. at 478.  
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The Court noted that “[t]he situs of the acts creating the nuisance, whether 
within or without the United States, is of no importance” because the harm 
occurred in the United States and the defendant was properly before the 
Court and subject to its jurisdiction.78 
In December 1931 the Court issued an injunction barring New York 
City from dumping garbage into the ocean effective June 1, 1933, the date 
recommended by the special master in order to enable the city to build 
new incinerators.79 The Court also ordered the city to use its existing 
incinerators at full capacity to reduce the amount of garbage dumped into 
the ocean and to report to the Court every six months concerning its 
progress in building new incinerators.80 After it became clear that New 
York City would not meet the deadline for ending ocean dumping, 
contempt proceedings were held.81 In December 1933 the Court extended 
the deadline to July 1, 1934, while imposing a $5,000 per day fine on the 
City if it missed this new deadline.82  
Meanwhile, Illinois and the Sanitary District were also facing lawsuits 
filed by the upper Great Lakes states in the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
1920’s. Wisconsin, Michigan, and New York had sued Illinois and the 
Sanitary District for allegedly diverting so much water from Lake 
Michigan that it had reduced the level of the Great Lakes by five to six 
inches, causing serious injury to people and property.83 Missouri and five 
other downstream states intervened to join Illinois as defendants because 
of their interest in keeping as much water as possible flowing through the 
drainage canal to the Mississippi River.84 
The Court accepted jurisdiction and appointed former Justice Charles 
Evans Hughes to serve as a special master.85 After taking extensive 
testimony, Hughes reported in November 1927 that the allegations by the 
upper Great Lakes states were correct.86 In January 1929 the Court 
accepted Hughes’s recommendations and ruled in favor of the upstream 
states. In an opinion by Chief Justice William Howard Taft, the Court 
rejected the notion that the Illinois and the Sanitary District were relieved 
from liability for harm caused to upstream states.87 The Court concluded 
                                                      
78. Id. at 482.  
79. New Jersey v. City of New York, 284 U.S. 585, 585–86 (1931) (per curiam). 
80. Id. at 586. 
81. New Jersey v. New York City, 290 U.S. 237, 238 (1933). 
82. Id. at 240. 
83. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 407–09 (1929).  
84. Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas participated in the 
case as intervening defendants. Id. at 370. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 407–09. 
87. Id. at 417–19. 
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that the upstream states were entitled to equitable relief,88 and it ultimately 
issued an injunction requiring Chicago to build sewage treatment plants to 
reduce its need to divert water from Lake Michigan.89  
B. The Court Sours on Hearing Interstate Nuisance Cases Following the 
Enactment of Federal Regulatory Statutes  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s long-time frustration with using its original 
jurisdiction to hear fact-intensive interstate nuisance suits and its difficulty 
in fashioning effective remedies ultimately led it to relegate such cases to 
the lower federal courts. On three occasions in 1971 and 1972, the Court 
declined requests to hear interstate nuisance cases in the exercise of its 
original jurisdiction.90 
In 1970, prior to the passage of the CWA, the state of Ohio sought to 
bring an original action in the Court against the Wyandotte Chemical 
Corporation and Dow Chemical of Canada to stop and remediate mercury 
pollution in Lake Erie.91 After scheduling an unusual oral argument on the 
question of whether to accept jurisdiction, the Court declined to hear the 
case.92 In an opinion by Justice Harlan the Court explained that even 
though it could exercise its original jurisdiction to hear the case, “no 
necessity impels” the Court to be the “principal forum for settling such 
controversies.”93 Harlan lamented the Court’s difficulty in resolving 
disputes of interstate air and water pollution.94 Noting the decisions in 
Missouri v. Illinois and New York v. New Jersey, Harlan felt the Court’s 
attempts to resolve the conflicts were futile because of the complex 
technical and political matters inherent in these cases.95 This was 
exacerbated by the novel scientific questions that have no clear answer.96 
Acknowledging the intense public concern for the environment that then 
                                                      
88. Id. at 418–21. 
89. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179, 201 (1930); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696, 697 
(1930) (per curiam). 
90. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp. 401 U.S. 493 (1971); Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); 
Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972).  
91. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. at 493. 
92. Id. at 494.  
93. Id. at 497. 
94. Id. at 505. 
95. Id. at 501–02. 
96. Id. at 501–03, 504–05. The papers of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall reveal that on the 
morning of oral argument, Chief Justice Burger distributed an unusual memo strongly cautioning his 
colleagues about the implications of a decision to hear the case. The Chief Justice cited the vast range 
of pollution problems facing the fifty states and the complexity of the issues. “If we do grant leave to 
file, I believe we should consider appointing not one but three Special Masters, at least one of whom 
should be a scientist with background in the subject matter and without conflicting attachments or 
published positions on the subject matter.” Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the 
Conference (Jan. 18, 1971) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
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prevailed, Justice Harlan conceded that stopping pollution “is manifestly a 
matter of fundamental import and utmost urgency.”97 But he described the 
Court’s refusal to hear the case as reflecting “that our competence is 
necessarily limited, not that our concern should be kept within narrow 
bounds.”98 
Only Justice William O. Douglas dissented. He, too, acknowledged the 
complexity of the issues presented by the case, but he argued that they 
were no more difficult than the complex issues that arise in water rights 
disputes between states that the Court routinely hears.99 Douglas cited the 
long-running dispute between Wisconsin and Illinois over the diversion of 
waters from Lake Michigan as well as disputes between Arizona and 
California over the Colorado River and disputes between Colorado, 
Wyoming and Nebraska over the waters of the North Platte River.100  
1. Milwaukee I (1972): The Court Keeps Federal Common Law 
Nuisance Claims Alive, but Relegates Them to Lower Federal 
Courts 
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), Illinois sought 
permission from the Supreme Court to bring an original action against four 
Wisconsin cities for polluting Lake Michigan through the discharge of 200 
million gallons of raw or poorly treated sewage each day.101 The case was 
decided six months before Congress enacted, over President Nixon’s veto, 
comprehensive new federal legislation, popularly known as the Clean 
Water Act (CWA), which required a permit for all point source discharges 
of pollutants.102 The Court noted that “Congress has enacted numerous 
laws touching interstate waters,” including the 1899 Rivers and Harbors 
Act that banned unpermitted discharges of refuse to navigable waters.103 
Federal law also authorized a cumbersome, and ultimately futile, interstate 
conference procedure as a vehicle for settling interstate water pollution 
                                                      
97. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. at 505.  
98. Id.  
99. Id. at 511 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
100. Id.  
101. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972).  
102. The official name of the CWA is the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
1251–1387 (2012). 
103. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 101. 
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disputes.104 In Milwaukee I, the Court rejected arguments that these laws 
displaced Illinois’s action.105  
In Milwaukee I, the Court held that states could bring federal common 
law nuisance actions in the district courts because they arise under federal 
law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.106 The Court cited with 
approval the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Texas v. Pankey107 as proof that 
federal district courts could hear interstate nuisance actions.108 Quoting 
from Pankey in a footnote, the Court stated that “[u]ntil the field has been 
made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized 
administrative standards, only a federal common law basis can provide an 
adequate means for dealing with such claims as alleged federal rights.”109 
But it also explained that “consideration of state standards may be 
relevant” because “a State with high water-quality standards may well ask 
that its strict standards be honored and that it not be compelled to lower 
itself to the more degrading standards of a neighbor.”110 The Court 
explained that when lower federal courts hear interstate nuisance actions 
“[t]here are no fixed rules that govern; these will be equity suits in which 
the informed judgment of the chancellor will largely govern.”111  
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice William O. Douglas noted:  
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations 
may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. 
But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to 
appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public 
nuisance by water pollution.112  
The Court recognized that “this original suit normally might be the 
appropriate vehicle for resolving this controversy,” but it chose instead to 
exercise its “discretion to remit the parties to an appropriate district court 
whose powers are adequate to resolve the issues.”113 
In a lawsuit between two states—Vermont and New York—the Court 
agreed to hear an interstate pollution dispute in exercise of its original 
                                                      
104. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Fed. Water Pollution Control Admin., Transcript of 
Conference in re Pollution of Lake Superior and its Tributary Basin in the States of Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, and Michigan (1969), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/20016W3S.PDF?Dockey=200 
16W3S.PDF [https://perma.cc/3EPP-D62X]. 
105. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 107.  
106. Id. at 98–99. 
107. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). 
108. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 99–101.  
109. Id. at 107 n.9 (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d at 241).  
110. Id. at 107.  
111. Id. at 107–08. 
112. Id. at 107.  
113. Id. at 108 (footnote omitted). 
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jurisdiction. In Vermont v. New York,114 the Court appointed a Special 
Master, who was able to negotiate a settlement between the parties 
involving a paper mill in New York.115 However, the Court stunned the 
parties in June 1974 by refusing to approve a proposed consent decree.116 
The Court explained that it did not want to assume continuing 
responsibility for supervising implementation of a consent decree in the 
absence of any law to apply.117 This “would materially change the function 
of the Court in these interstate contests” to one of performing arbitral 
rather than judicial functions.118  
In sum, the Supreme Court’s rulings in Milwaukee I and Vermont v. 
New York demonstrated that it was growing increasingly weary of 
exercising its original jurisdiction in such complex interstate nuisance 
claims. And with the passage of the CWA in 1972, the Court finally had 
the opportunity to rule on federal common law nuisance claims in the 
context of a comprehensive federal regulatory regime. This all came to a 
head in Milwaukee II, discussed below. 
2. Milwaukee II (1981): Preemption and the Clean Water Act 
After failing to convince the U.S. Supreme Court to hear its nuisance 
action against the City of Milwaukee as an original action, Illinois re-filed 
its lawsuit in federal district court in Illinois. Less than five months later, 
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments in 
October 1972 (Clean Water Act) over President Nixon’s veto.119 This set 
up a showdown over whether the common law had been preempted 
because Illinois maintained that the permits issued to Milwaukee’s plants 
still allowed levels of pollutant discharges that would constitute public 
nuisances.120  
After a six-month trial, in July 1977 the Illinois federal district court 
upheld the state’s claim that Milwaukee’s discharge constituted a public 
nuisance under federal common law and rejected the argument that the 
new CWA permit program preempted the federal common law of 
nuisance.121 It ordered the city to meet more stringent effluent limits and to 
construct facilities to eliminate combined sewer overflows by 1989.122  
                                                      
114. Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974) (per curiam). 
115. Id. at 270–71. 
116. Id. at 274. 
117. Id. at 277.  
118. Id.  
119. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–500, 86 Stat. 
816. 
120. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 310–11 (1981).  
121. Id. at 311.  
122. Id. at 311–12. 
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On appeal the Seventh Circuit recognized the comprehensiveness of the 
CWA’s new regulatory program for controlling pollution;123 however, it 
still affirmed the district court’s holding that federal common law was not 
pre-empted.124 The court noted that § 510 of the CWA125 preserves the 
authority of states to adopt more stringent standards than required by the 
CWA, and it cited § 511’s directive that the CWA not be construed to 
limit the federal authority, to include federal common law.126 The court 
also noted that the savings clause in the citizen suit provision of the 
CWA127 expressly preserved any common law claims, which it interpreted 
to include both state and federal common law.128 While concluding that 
the district court had failed to justify imposing more stringent effluent 
limits for certain pollutants, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s order to eliminate combined sewer overflows and to impose a new 
limit on phosphorus discharges.129 
When Milwaukee sought review of the Seventh Circuit’s decision by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court initially voted to deny review.130 
However, after Justice White drafted a dissent from denial of certiorari 
questioning the competence of courts to impose effluent limits stricter than 
those required in existing permits,131 the Court agreed to hear the case.132 
At oral argument the Solicitor General appeared as an amicus supporting 
Illinois’s position that the CWA did not preempt the federal common law 
of nuisance.133 But in April 1981 the Court held that the Act had 
preempted federal common law when it finally decided Milwaukee II.134 
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court noted that legislative 
preemption of federal common law did not implicate the same federalism 
concerns that require clear expressions of congressional intent before state 
                                                      
123. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 162 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated, Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 
at 304. 
124. Illinois, 599 F.2d at 162, 177. 
125. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2012). 
126. Illinois, 599 F.2d at 162; 33 U.S.C. § 1371. 
127. Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012). 
128. Illinois, 599 F.2d at 163. 
129. Id. at 177.  
130. Memorandum from Justice Byron R. White circulating Draft Dissent from Denial of 
Certiorari (Mar. 3, 1980) (on file with Library of Congress). 
131. In his draft dissent Justice White noted that he did “not necessarily disagree with the 
decision below,” but “that there is substantial doubt as to whether Congress intended that inexpert 
federal courts, guided by principles of common-law nuisance and maxims of equity jurisprudence, 
could impose environmental duties stricter than those adopted through democratic processes and 
developed by supposedly expert federal and state agencies.” Justice White expressed the fear that 
“many interstate bodies of water . . . could become the subject of federal common-law nuisance 
actions.” Id. 
132. 445 U.S. 926 (1980) (mem.). 
133. Id. at 307.  
134. Id. at 304.  
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law may be preempted.135 Justice Rehnquist interpreted the language of § 
505(e) narrowly to mean:  
[T]hat nothing in § 505, the citizen-suit provision, should be read as 
limiting any other remedies which might exist. . . . [I]t means only 
that the provision of such suit does not revoke other remedies. It 
most assuredly cannot be read to mean that the [CWA] as a whole 
does not supplant formerly available federal common-law actions 
but only that the particular section authorizing citizen suits does not 
do so.136  
Citing the comprehensive nature of the CWA’s regulatory scheme and the 
technical complexities courts would have to confront to formulate 
pollution control standards, Justice Rehnquist concluded that Congress 
implicitly had supplanted federal common law by adopting a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme for water pollution control.137 Justice 
Rehnquist concluded that “[t]he establishment of such a self-consciously 
comprehensive program by Congress, which certainly did not exist when 
Illinois v. Milwaukee was decided, strongly suggests that there is no room 
for courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal common 
law.”138 He went on to note that application of federal common law would 
be 
peculiarly inappropriate in areas as complex as water pollution 
control. . . . Not only are the technical problems difficult—doubtless 
the reason Congress vested authority to administer the [CWA] in 
administrative agencies possessing the necessary expertise—but the 
general area is particularly unsuited to the approach inevitable under 
a regime of federal common law. Congress criticized past 
approaches to water pollution control as being “sporadic” and “ad 
hoc,” apt characterizations of any judicial approach applying federal 
common law.139 
Justice Rehnquist noted that Illinois was free to pursue its case for more 
stringent controls on Milwaukee’s discharges before the Wisconsin state 
agency responsible for issuing Milwaukee a permit under the CWA.140 But 
he maintained that “[i]t would be quite inconsistent with this scheme if 
federal courts were . . . to ‘write their own ticket’ under the guise of 
                                                      
135. Id. at 316–17.  
136. Id. at 328–29. 
137. Id. at 317–19.  
138. Id. at 319 (citing Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971)). 
139. Id. at 325 (citations omitted). 
140. Id. at 326.  
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federal common law after permits have already been issued and permittees 
have been planning and operating in reliance on them.”141 
In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by two other Justices, argued that 
the savings clause and legislative history of the Act clearly expressed 
intent by Congress to not preempt federal common law.142 While 
conceding that interstate nuisance cases often are complex, Blackmun 
argued, “[T]hey do not require courts to perform functions beyond their 
traditional capacities or experience.”143 He concluded that the Court’s 
decision was particularly unfortunate because it would undermine efforts 
to promote “a more uniform federal approach to the problem of alleviating 
interstate pollution . . . .”144 
Milwaukee II’s impact was immediate as applied to analogous federal 
regulatory regimes. Two months after its decision in Milwaukee II, the 
Court held that the Ocean Dumping Act’s permit scheme pre-empted 
federal common law.145 In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. 
National Sea Clammers Ass’n, the Court concluded that regulating 
discharges to such waters146 displaced the federal common law of nuisance 
because it “is no less comprehensive, with respect to ocean dumping, than 
are analogous provisions” in the CWA.147  
Two decades later, when it rejected Exxon’s claim that the CWA 
preempted private claims for punitive damages for pollution caused by the 
Exxon Valdez spill, the Court distinguished Milwaukee II and National 
Sea Clammers.148 The Court described these as cases “where plaintiffs’ 
common law nuisance claims amounted to arguments for effluent-
discharge standards different from those provided by the CWA.”149 The 
“private claims for economic injury” in the Exxon Valdez litigation “do 
not threaten similar interference with federal regulatory goals,” the Court 
explained.150  
But Milwaukee II did not eliminate all common law nuisance actions. 
Left unresolved was the question of whether the CWA preempts state 
common law nuisance actions. This would have to wait for the Court’s 
decision in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, which has important 
                                                      
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 332, 338–39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
143. Id. at 349.  
144. Id. at 353. 
145. Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981). 
146. Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 
1052. 
147. Nat’l Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 22. 
148. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).  
149. Id. at 489 n.7. 
150. Id.  
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significance for future climate-change common law state nuisance claims, 
as discussed below.  
3. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette (1987): The Court Preserves 
State Common Law Claims  
In 1987, six years after Milwaukee II was decided, the Supreme Court 
decided International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, re-affirming the viability of 
state common law nuisance claims.151 In Ouellette, the Court held that the 
CWA did not preempt state common law so long as the law of the source 
state was applied.152 Ouellette involved a private nuisance action brought 
by lakeshore property owners in Vermont state court against the same 
paper mill that had spawned Vermont v. New York.153 The defendant 
removed the action to federal court, asserting that the CWA preempted the 
state common law claim in light of the Milwaukee II decision.154 
In Ouellette, the Solicitor General again appeared as an amicus to 
support the plaintiffs’ position that the CWA did not preempt state 
common law actions.155 The Court agreed, but five Justices insisted that in 
transboundary nuisance cases only the common law of the source state 
could apply.156 The papers of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall indicate 
that these Justices struggled mightily to come up with a legal justification 
for this conclusion, which was largely a product of what they thought 
would represent good policy.157  
Justice Powell’s majority opinion ultimately rested preemption of the 
receiving state’s common law on the fear that downstream states could 
interfere with the goals of the CWA by dictating unreasonably stringent 
and potentially conflicting standards on upstream sources.158 But he 
concluded that “nothing in the Act bars aggrieved individuals from 
bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State,” citing 
                                                      
151. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
152. Id. at 498–500.  
153. Id. at 484.  
154. Id.  
155. Id. at 498. 
156. Id. at 498–500.  
157. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the 
Marshall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10606, 10618 (1993). Justice Powell, who had been assigned the 
task of drafting the majority opinion, had sent the other Justices an unusual memo asking for ideas 
concerning how to reach this result. Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Powell (Nov. 17, 
1986) (on file with the Library of Congress). Justice Scalia proposed the idea of interpreting 
Milwaukee I as implicitly preempting state common law by recognizing that the federal courts could 
apply federal common law in interstate nuisance disputes. He proposed that the Court then declare that 
Congress, by adopting the CWA, had resuscitated state common law, but only when the law of source 
states was applied. Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Scalia (Nov. 18, 1986) (on file with 
the Library of Congress).  
158. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494–96. 
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the express preservation of the right of states to impose more stringent 
standards on their own point sources in the Act’s savings clause.159 The 
four dissenters criticized any preemption of state common law and argued 
that federal courts should apply normal choice-of-law principles when 
hearing state common law actions over interstate pollution.160 
The Table below displays the core environmental common law 
nuisance claims throughout the twentieth century and where state and 
federal common law nuisance claims stood at the beginning of the twenty-
first century: 
 
Table 1: The Evolution of Twentieth Century Interstate Nuisance Claims 
Case Name Year Federal Common Law 
Public Nuisance 
Claims? 
State Common Law 
Public Nuisance 
Claims? 
Missouri v. 
Illinois 
1906 Missouri had failed to 
prove sufficient causal 
injury 
Not specifically 
addressed 
Georgia v. 
Tennessee 
Copper 
1907 States have important 
“quasi-sovereign” 
interests 
Not specifically 
addressed 
Milwaukee I 1972 Not displaced prior to 
enactment of 
comprehensive CWA 
Not specifically 
addressed 
Milwaukee II 1981 CWA has displaced 
such claims 
Not specifically 
addressed 
International 
Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette 
1987 Not specifically 
addressed 
Allowed as long as the 
law of the source state 
is preserved 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
159. Id. at 497; 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2012) (“Statutory or common law rights not restricted—
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under 
any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).”).  
160. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 501–02 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 509 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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II. COMMON LAW CLIMATE LITIGATION 
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court was 
effectively out of the business of utilizing its original jurisdiction to hear 
interstate pollution disputes. It was widely assumed that the CAA 
Amendments of 1990, which added a comprehensive federal permit 
program to the CAA, would also displace federal common law nuisance 
actions for interstate air pollution whenever a court was forced squarely to 
confront such a case.161 But the CAA’s express preemption clause only 
covers motor vehicle-related claims—it does not expressly address non-
motor vehicle-related claims.162 And under Ouellette, state common law 
nuisance actions for transboundary pollution remained alive so long as the 
law of the source state was applied.163 It was not until more than two 
decades later when the Supreme Court addressed the CAA regulatory 
regime in the context of federal common law nuisance claims in AEP. 
A. AEP v. Connecticut in District Court: An Initial Test for Common Law 
Nuisance Claims Under the Clean Air Act 
In July 2004 eight states and the City of New York filed a federal and 
state common law nuisance action against five of the largest electric 
                                                      
161. The Ninth Circuit in National Audubon Society v. Department of Water, 869 F.2d 1196 (9th 
Cir. 1989), held that the CWA preempts a federal common law nuisance action against the Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power for damage it caused by diverting water from Mono Lake, 
but it reserved judgment on the question whether the federal CAA would preempt a federal common 
law nuisance action against the Department for air pollution. The Ninth Circuit held that a federal 
common law action was not available under the facts of the case because, unlike the situation in 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., there was no interstate dispute involved. Id. at 1204–05. A 
dissenting judge argued that there is a uniquely federal interest in preserving air quality even in 
intrastate disputes. Id. at 1208–09 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Even before the 1990 CAA Amendments 
were adopted, some lower federal courts had suggested that the CAA could preempt federal common 
law nuisance actions for interstate air pollution. See United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 
(D.N.J 1982); New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981). 
162. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012). 
163. Professor Daniel Farber has described the significance of Ouellette for the vitality of 
common law nuisance actions in the following terms: “after hanging by its fingernails from a cliff in 
Milwaukee II, the common law came roaring back in the final episode.” DANIEL A. FARBER, The Story 
of Boomer: Pollution and the Common Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 7, 40 (Richard J. 
Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005). The requirement that the state common law of the source state 
be applied did not significantly disadvantage the plaintiffs in Ouellette. On remand, New York 
nuisance law proved no more favorable to the paper company than Vermont’s would have been. The 
company ultimately settled with the plaintiffs for five million dollars, including the establishment of a 
trust fund for environmental projects in the Lake Champlain area. The colorful story of this litigation is 
recounted by Peter Langrock, the plaintiffs’ lawyer, in PETER LANGROCK, ADDISON COUNTY JUSTICE: 
TALES FROM A VERMONT COURTHOUSE 69–86 (1997). 
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utilities in the United States.164 The suit alleged that power plants operated 
by the defendant utilities contribute 10 percent of U.S. emissions of carbon 
dioxide (CO2), a greenhouse gas that contributes to global warming and 
climate change.165 The plaintiff further claimed that global warming 
already had begun to alter the climate of the United States and that it was 
causing significant harm to them.166 In their lawsuit, they sought an order 
holding the defendants jointly and severally liable for contributing to 
global warming and an injunction ordering the companies to cap their 
emissions of CO2 and then to reduce them by a specified percentage each 
year for at least a decade.167  
The case raised the question of whether the CAA preempts the federal 
common law of nuisance for interstate air pollution.168 While the CAA 
was amended in 1990 to add a comprehensive permit program similar to 
the CWA, at the time the lawsuit was filed the CAA had not been used to 
regulate CO2. During the George W. Bush Administration, EPA’s general 
counsel asserted that the agency lacked the authority to regulate CO2 
emissions under the CAA.169 
On September 15, 2005, Federal District Judge Loretta Preska 
dismissed the states’ lawsuit without reaching the critical preemption 
issue.170 Instead, she held that the case presented non-justiciable political 
questions.171 In doing so, she distinguished previous interstate nuisance 
cases like Georgia v. Tennessee Copper and New Jersey v. New York City, 
by noting that none “has touched on so many areas of national and 
international policy” as the climate change litigation,172 stating:  
The explicit statements of Congress and the Executive on the issue 
of global climate change in general and their specific refusal to 
impose the limits on carbon dioxide emissions Plaintiffs now seek 
to impose by judicial fiat confirm that making the “initial policy 
determination[s]” addressing global climate change is an 
undertaking for the political branches.173  
                                                      
164. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, 
564 U.S. 410 (2011). The five states included Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, New Jersey, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id. 
165. Id. at 268. 
166. Id.  
167. Id. at 270.  
168. Id.  
169. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 512 (2007). 
170. 406 F. Supp. 2d at 265. 
171. Id. at 274.  
172. Id. at 272. 
173. Id. at 274 (alteration in original). 
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Judge Preska further noted that “[b]ecause resolution of the issues 
presented here requires identification and balancing of economic, 
environmental, foreign policy, and national security interests,” the case 
“present[s] non-justiciable political questions that are consigned to the 
political branches, not the Judiciary.”174 
Judge Preska’s decision was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, which heard oral argument in June 2006. But the 
appellate court put the case on hold while waiting for the U.S. Supreme 
Court to decide Massachusetts v. EPA, a case that challenged the George 
W. Bush Administration’s authority to regulate emissions of GHGs under 
the CAA.175  
B. The Intervening Ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) and the Second 
Circuit’s Subsequent Ruling in AEP v. Connecticut (2009) 
 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court in a closely decided 5–4 held that 
climate change sufficiently affected the state of Massachusetts to give it 
standing to challenge EPA’s failure to regulate emissions of GHGs.176 On 
the merits, the Court held that EPA did have the authority to regulate 
emissions of GHGs under the CAA if it found that they “endanger” public 
health or welfare by contributing to global warming and climate change.177 
The Court remanded the case to EPA to consider whether to make an 
“endangerment finding.”178  
The Court’s decision, written by Justice Stevens, relied heavily on 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., the century-old nuisance case discussed 
in Part I. Despite not being cited in any of the many briefs filed with the 
                                                      
174. Id. 
175. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
176. Id.  
177. Id. at 527–28. 
178. Id. at 534–35. The Administrative Procedure Act grants the public the right to petition 
agencies for the issuance of rules. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (“Each agency shall give an interested person the 
right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”). While agencies have an obligation 
to respond to these petitions, in practice they often are ignored for many years and it is extremely 
difficult to establish that a failure to respond is agency action “unreasonably delayed” that can be 
redressed by judicial review. See, e.g., Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). Indeed, the landmark Massachusetts v. EPA litigation never would have made it through 
the courthouse doors except for the fact that the Bush Administration wanted to trumpet its new policy 
decision that EPA did not have the authority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA. It thus seized 
upon a petition from an obscure NGO asking EPA to conduct a rulemaking on GHG emissions from 
mobile sources and denied it to emphasize the new policy. EPA Press Release, EPA Denies Petition to 
Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor Vehicles, August 28, 2003, https://archive.epa.gov/e 
papages/newsroom_archive/newsreleases/694c8f3b7c16ff6085256d900065fdad.html. Had that not 
happened, the petition probably could still be sitting at EPA unanswered and Massachusetts v. EPA 
never would have made it to court.  
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Court,179 Justice Stevens turned to Justice Holmes’s century-old reasoning 
on the status of states in interstate nuisance claims, re-affirming that, 
“[w]ell before the creation of the modern administrative state, we 
recognized that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking 
federal jurisdiction.”180 He further noted, “Just as Georgia’s independent 
interest ‘in all the earth and air within its domain’ supported federal 
jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts’s well-founded 
desire to preserve its sovereign territory today.”181 
After a round of supplemental briefing on Massachusetts v. EPA’s 
impact, two years elapsed before the Second Circuit panel released its 
decision in AEP.182 The decision was released on September 21, 2009, just 
six weeks after one of the panel’s members, Judge Sonia Sotomayor, had 
been elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court.183 The remaining two judges on 
the panel, Judge Hall, joined by Judge McLaughlin, issued a ninety-page 
opinion that reversed Judge Preska’s decision and held that climate change 
was not a non-justiciable “political question.”184 The court held that the 
states had parens patriae and Article III standing, and New York City and 
the land trusts who had joined the litigation had Article III standing.185 The 
court also found that the CAA did not displace the plaintiffs’ common law 
nuisance claim, allowing the case to go forward to trial.186  
                                                      
179. The first mention of the Georgia v. Tennessee Copper precedent occurred at oral argument. 
Justice Kennedy suggested the case when counsel for Massachusetts was struggling to respond to a 
question concerning what his “best case” was supporting the state’s standing. See Oral Argument at 
14:42, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120), http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-20 
09/2006/2006_05_1120 [https://perma.cc/MZN7-3YVL]. 
180. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518. 
181. Id. at 519 (“When a state enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. 
Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot 
negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India . . . .”). Id.  
182. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S. 410 
(2011). 
183. Adam Liptak, Justices Rebuff States on Utilities’ Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 
2011, at A18. 
184. 582 F.3d at 309. 
185. Id. at 392. Parens patriae means “[t]he state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its 
capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(7th ed. 1999). See also Zdeb, supra note 22. 
186. 582 F.3d at 392. The panel usefully explained the difference between displacement and 
preemption in the following terms:  
[T]he concept of “displacement” refers to a situation in which “federal statutory law governs 
a question previously the subject of federal common law.” The term “pre-emption,” in 
contrast, generally addresses a circumstance in which a federal statute supersedes state law, 
but courts have also frequently used the word “pre-emption” when discussing whether a 
statute displaces federal common law. We further note that the “appropriate analysis” in 
determining whether displacement of the federal common law has occurred “is not the same 
as that employed in deciding if federal law pre-empts state law.”  
Id. at 371 n.37 (citations omitted) (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981)). 
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The court noted that Massachusetts v. EPA made it “clear that EPA has 
statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gases as a ‘pollutant’ under the 
Clean Air Act.”187 The court concluded, “until EPA makes the requisite 
findings, for the purposes of our displacement analysis the CAA does not 
(1) regulate greenhouse gas emissions or (2) regulate such emissions from 
stationary sources.”188 Thus, it concluded that the problem has not been 
“thoroughly addressed” by the CAA, unlike the situation in Milwaukee II 
in the context of the CWA.189 Milwaukee II addressed the viability of 
federal common law water pollution nuisance claims in the aftermath of 
the CWA’s passage.190 The Court in Milwaukee II found that the CWA 
supplanted federal common law when Congress adopted a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme for water pollution control.191 The CAA presents a 
more difficult problem—the extent to which Congress has delegated to the 
EPA the ability to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Hence, the Second 
Circuit found that “neither Congress nor EPA has regulated greenhouse 
gas emissions from stationary sources in such a way as to ‘speak directly’ 
to the ‘particular issue’ raised by Plaintiffs.”192 Thus, it concluded that the 
CAA had not displaced Connecticut’s lawsuit.193 
C. AEP v. Connecticut (2011): Displacing Federal Common Law Claims 
but Leaving the Door Open for State Common Law Claims  
The Supreme Court agreed to review the Second Circuit’s decision in 
AEP.194 Numerous industry groups implored the Court to follow the 
federal district court’s holding that climate change litigation raised non-
justiciable political questions or to reject the lawsuit on the grounds that 
the effects of climate change were too diffuse or uncertain to give rise to 
Article III standing.195 Some private nuisance actions had been filed 
against oil companies seeking damages for their contribution to climate 
change and many defendants hoped the Supreme Court would preclude all 
such litigation on constitutional grounds. The Solicitor General, 
                                                      
187. Id. at 378. 
188. 582 F.3d at 381. The endangerment finding was made in December 2009. Endangerment 
and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 
74 Fed. Reg. 66,495 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
189. Id. (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 320 (1981)).  
190. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 310–12 (1981). 
191. Id. at 317–19.  
192. 582 F.3d at 387. 
193. Id. at 387–88. 
194. AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
195. A total of twenty amicus briefs supporting the utility defendants were filed by various 
groups, including trade associations representing the utility, oil, auto, chemical, and construction 
industries. Id. at 414–15. 
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representing the Tennessee Valley Authority, argued that the Court should 
dismiss the case not for lack of Article III standing, but for lack of 
prudential standing because the global nature of climate change is a 
generalized grievance best addressed by the political branches of 
government.196 Due to the recusal of the recently appointed Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, only eight Justices heard the case.197 The four key components 
of the ruling are discussed below.  
First, by a split 4–4 vote, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s 
rejection of arguments that (1) the plaintiffs lacked standing and that (2) 
the case raised a non-justiciable political question.198 The Court stated that 
four of its members “would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article 
III standing under Massachusetts [v. EPA], which permitted a State to 
challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and, 
further, that no other threshold obstacle bars review” including the 
political question doctrine and the Solicitor General’s argument that the 
case should be dismissed because of a prudential bar to adjudicating 
generalized grievances.199 Four other Justices—likely the dissenters in 
Massachusetts v. EPA—“would hold that none of the plaintiffs have 
Article III standing.”200  
Second, in her opinion for the otherwise unanimous Court, Justice 
Ginsburg addressed the propriety of federal courts fashioning federal 
common law in the area of environmental protection.201 Citing Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, she explained: “The ‘new’ federal common law 
addresses ‘subjects within national legislative power where Congress has 
so directed’ or where the basic scheme of the Constitution so demands.”202 
Justice Ginsburg declared that “[e]nvironmental protection is undoubtedly 
an area ‘within national legislative power,’ one in which federal courts 
may fill in ‘statutory interstices,’ and, if necessary, even ‘fashion federal 
                                                      
196. See Brief for Tennessee Valley Authority as Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 14–24, 
AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (No. 10-174). 
197. Justice Sonia Sotomayor recused herself because she had been on the Second Circuit panel 
that initially heard oral argument in the case, although she was elevated to the Supreme Court before 
the Second Circuit released its decision with the two remaining judges on the panel agreeing to reverse 
the district court. See, e.g., Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Takes up Climate “Nuisance” Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2010), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/12/06/06green 
wire-supreme-court-takes-up-climate-nuisance-case-71478.html?emc=rss&pagewanted=all&partner= 
rss (noting that Justice Sotomayer had recused herself from hearing the case). 
198. AEP, 564 U.S. at 419–420. 
199. Id. at 420 & n.6 (citation omitted). 
200. Id. at 420. 
201. Id. at 420–23.  
202. Id. at 421 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common 
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 422 (1964)).  
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law.’”203 She quoted the statement in Milwaukee I that “[w]hen we deal 
with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal 
common law.”204  
Justice Ginsburg then noted that the Court had never decided whether 
private citizens or political subdivisions (e.g., cities, municipalities) could 
use the federal common law of nuisance to seek redress for interstate 
pollution.205 “Nor have we ever held that a State may sue to abate any and 
all manner of pollution originating outside its borders.”206 Justice Ginsburg 
noted that the defendants sought to distinguish this case from previous 
interstate nuisance cases because of the “scale and complexity” of climate 
change.207 But, citing Justice Holmes’s recognition of the germ theory of 
disease in Missouri v. Illinois, she observed, “[P]ublic nuisance law, like 
common law generally, adapts to changing scientific and factual 
circumstances.”208  
On the critical federal common law displacement issue, the Court held 
“that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any 
federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions 
from fossil-fuel fired powerplants [sic].”209 The test for displacement “is 
simply whether the statute ‘speaks[s] directly to [the] question’ at issue,” 
the Court declared, and the CAA “‘speaks directly’ to emissions of carbon 
dioxide” from power plants.210 While EPA had yet to finish its 
endangerment rulemaking, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that 
federal common law is not displaced until EPA actually exercises its 
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.211  
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion explained that the “critical point is that 
Congress delegated to EPA the decision whether and how to regulate 
carbon-dioxide emissions from powerplants [sic]; the delegation is what 
displaces federal common law.”212 Further, “were EPA to decline to 
regulate carbon-dioxide emissions altogether at the conclusion of its 
ongoing § 7411 rulemaking, the federal courts would have no warrant to 
employ the federal common law of nuisance to upset the Agency’s expert 
                                                      
203. Id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421 (1964)). 
204. Id. (quoting Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972)).  
205. Id. at 422. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 423 (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 522 (1906)). 
209. Id. at 424. 
210. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 
(1978)).  
211. Id. at 425–26.  
212. Id. at 426 (emphasis added).  
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determination.”213 Justice Ginsburg took pains to emphasize that EPA, as 
the expert administrative agency entrusted by Congress with the task of 
controlling air pollution, “is surely better equipped to do the job than 
individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.”214  
Third, in critical language with widespread implications for future 
climate change-related litigation, she emphasized that a future EPA 
decision to not regulate CO2 emissions “would not escape judicial 
review”215 and that “EPA may not decline to regulate carbon-dioxide 
emissions from powerplants [sic] if refusal to act would be ‘arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.’”216 The order of decision-making prescribed by Congress—“the first 
decider under the Act is the expert administrative agency, the second, 
federal judges”—is fitting because the “appropriate amount of regulation 
in any particular greenhouse gas-producing sector cannot be prescribed in 
a vacuum.”217  
Nonetheless, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the critical role that federal 
courts have in overseeing EPA’s actions—just not in the first instance. 
While the federal courts “would have no warrant to employ the federal 
common law of nuisance to upset the Agency’s expert determination,” 
such a determination would still be subject to the Administrative 
Procedure Act.218 While EPA can establish emissions standards for GHGs 
that, “‘in [the Administrator’s] judgment,’ ‘caus[e], or contribut[e] 
significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare . . . . ‘[t]he use of the word judgment . . . 
is not a roving license.”219 Any refusal to regulate carbon-dioxide 
emissions remains subject to the citizen suit provisions of the CAA and a 
refusal to act must not be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”220 In sum, Justice Ginsburg called 
attention to potential future litigation in the event that EPA decides to not 
regulate GHG emissions at the conclusion of the rulemaking process.221 In 
light of this language for a unanimous Court, it seems likely that the 
Supreme Court would closely scrutinize any decision by the Trump EPA 
                                                      
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 428. 
215. Id. at 426. 
216. Id. at 427 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)). 
217. Id.  
218. Id. at 426. 
219. Id. at 426–27 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) and Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007)). 
220. Id. at 427 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)). 
221. “If the plaintiffs in this case are dissatisfied with the outcome of EPA’s forthcoming 
rulemaking, their recourse under federal law is to seek Court of Appeals review, and, ultimately, to 
petition for certiorari in this Court.” Id. 
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to reverse the endangerment finding. 
Fourth, Justice Ginsburg specifically reserved judgment on the question 
whether state common law nuisance actions were preempted by the CAA, 
noting that it was a question that had not been briefed or argued.222 
Although preemption of state common law was not a question presented to 
the Court, she affirmatively cited Ouellette’s holding that the CWA did 
not preempt such suits when the law of the source state was applied,223 
thus leaving the door open for future state law suits. Justice Alito, joined 
by Justice Thomas, filed the following concurrence “I concur in the 
judgment, and I agree with the Court’s displacement analysis on the 
assumption (which I make for the sake of argument because no party 
contends otherwise) that the interpretation of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7401 et seq., adopted by the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497 (2007), is correct.” The two still contest the Court’s holding in 
Massachusetts. 
In sum, the Supreme Court’s decision in AEP confirmed that the CAA 
broadly displaced the federal common law of nuisance for climate change-
related claims by delegating to EPA the responsibility for developing a 
regulatory response to the problem. In doing so, it rejected efforts to erect 
constitutional obstacles to climate litigation (such as the political question 
doctrine) even as it blocked the use of federal common law actions. The 
Supreme Court also affirmed that states have standing to sue, reaffirming 
the historical role that the Court has played in resolving environmental 
disputes between states.224 By briefly addressing the viability of future 
state law litigation, the Court at least kept the door open for future climate 
litigation. 
III. FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN THE WAKE OF AEP V. CONNECTICUT 
The rationale for displacement of federal common law in AEP was that 
the CAA delegated to EPA the responsibility to prevent harm from climate 
change.225 The lower federal courts have addressed displacement issues in 
the two decisions discussed below. The Seventh Circuit has held that 
transboundary environmental problems, such as invasive species, not 
directly addressed by the CWA can still serve as the basis for a federal 
common law action.226 The Ninth Circuit has dismissed a federal common 
                                                      
222. Id. at 429.  
223. Id.  
224. Id. at 509–10. 
225. Id. at 424–26. 
226. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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law action seeking damages from fossil fuel industries due to harm caused 
by climate change.227  
A. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: The Seventh Circuit 
Confirms the Role of the Common Law as a Regulatory Backstop 
The continued viability of federal common law as a regulatory 
backstop was confirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.228 In this case, states 
filed a federal common law nuisance action in an effort to stop the spread 
of two invasive species of Asian carp (bighead carp and silver carp) into 
the Great Lakes.229 Initially imported into the U.S. by fish farms in 
Arkansas, the carp escaped to the Mississippi River and worked their way 
upstream to the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal—the very canal that 
gave rise to the Missouri v. Illinois case—from which it is feared they will 
enter Lake Michigan and spread throughout the Great Lakes.230  
After failing to persuade the U.S. Supreme Court to act, five states filed 
a federal public nuisance action in federal district court in Illinois on July 
19, 2010.231 The suit alleged that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had 
created a public nuisance by managing the Chicago Area Waterway 
System (CAWS) in a manner that would allow the Asian carp to reach the 
Great Lakes.232 The states asked the court to issue an injunction requiring 
the closing of the CAWS locks and requiring the Corps to develop a plan 
to permanently separate the carp-infested Chicago River from Lake 
Michigan.233 The Corps noted that to date Congress had directed the Corps 
only to study options for preventing the transfer of invasive aquatic 
species between the two basins.234 
                                                      
227. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
228. 667 F.3d at 765. 
229. See id. at 768–69. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has designated one species of Asian 
carp—the silver carp—as an injurious species, 50 C.F.R. § 16.13(a)(2)(v)(D) (2017), making it a 
federal crime under the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3372, to transport them into or around the United 
States. Injurious Wildlife Species; Silver Carp (Hypophthelmichthys molitrix) and Largescale Silver 
Carp (Hypophthelmichthys harmandi), 72 Fed. Reg. 37,459 (July 10, 2007). A similar listing for 
bighead carp remains under review. 
230. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d at 768. The carp, which can grow to sixty pounds or 
more, “are voracious eaters that consume small organisms on which the entire food chain relies; they 
crowd out native species as they enter new environments; they reproduce at a high rate; they travel 
quickly and adapt readily; and they have a dangerous habit of jumping out of the water and harming 
people and property.” U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d at 768; see also Michigan v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10–CV–4457, 2010 WL 5018559, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2010). 
231. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2010 WL 5018559, at *1 & n.1. 
232. Id. at *3–4. 
233. Id. at *1–2.  
234. Id. at *11. 
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Despite upholding the right of the Great Lakes states to bring a federal 
nuisance action, Judge Dow denied their request for a preliminary 
injunction.235 He concluded that while the potential damage to the Great 
Lakes was high, the level of certainty that any damage will occur is low.236 
He also noted that judicial restraint was in order because “multiple federal 
and state agencies are expending significant effort carrying out their 
statutory and regulatory duties to maintain and operate the CAWS, study 
and address the threat of Asian carp, and take whatever emergency 
measures they deem appropriate to prevent Asian carp ‘from dispersing 
into the Great Lakes.’”237  
The plaintiff States appealed Judge Dow’s ruling to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In July 2011, while the appeal was 
pending, the Corps of Engineers released a list of forty aquatic invasive 
species that it believes pose the greatest risk of migrating through the 
CAWS.238 This list included thirty species, including zebra mussels, that 
pose a significant risk to the Mississippi River Basin and ten, including the 
Asian carp, that threaten the Great Lakes.239 This study helped mobilize a 
bipartisan coalition of state attorneys general to lobby Congress to require 
permanent ecological separation between the Great Lakes and Mississippi 
River basins.240  
On August 24, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
upheld the district court decision refusing to require the Corps to take 
additional action to control Asian carp.241 Although it denied the states the 
relief they requested, the court affirmed their right to use the federal 
common law of nuisance to address the threat posed by the Asian carp, 
while reserving the question whether a state can bring a public nuisance 
claim against a federal agency.242 The court became the first U.S. Court of 
Appeals to assess the impact of the Supreme Court’s AEP decision on the 
federal common law of nuisance. 
The Seventh Circuit panel, in an opinion by Judge Diane Wood, 
rejected the defendants’ arguments that nuisance actions must be confined 
to traditional pollutants:243  
                                                      
235. Id. at *34.  
236. Id. at *30. 
237. Id.  
238. See Schuette Building National Coalition Against Aquatic Invasive Species, 
MICHIGAN.GOV (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.michigan.gov/som/0,4669,7-192-26847-261562--,00.ht 
ml [https://perma. cc/BYL2-69R6].  
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2011).  
242. Id.  
243. Id. at 771.  
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While it may be true that the introduction of an invasive species of 
fish into a new ecosystem does not fit the concept of nuisance as 
neatly as a spill of toxic chemicals into a stream, we do not think the 
Supreme Court has limited the concept of public nuisance as much 
as the defendants suggest.244  
Further, the court declared that “[i]t would be arbitrary to conclude that 
this type of action extends to the harm caused by industrial pollution but 
not to the environmental and economic destruction caused by the 
introduction of an invasive, non-native organism into a new ecosystem . . . 
.”245 
Relying on the statement in AEP that “the delegation is what 
displaces,” the Corps of Engineers and the City of Chicago argued that the 
Supreme Court had created a new and more expansive test for 
displacement: federal common law is displaced once Congress indicates 
its intention to delegate a particular problem to an executive agency.246 
The Seventh Circuit panel rejected this argument.247 It concluded that “the 
Court did not establish a new test based solely on Congress’s delegation of 
regulatory power; it simply pointed out that delegation is one type of 
congressional action that is evidence of displacement.”248 It stressed that in 
AEP the Supreme Court emphasized the comprehensive nature of the 
CAA even with respect to regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, the 
multiple avenues for public and private enforcement, and the right of the 
public to seek judicial review of denials of petitions for rulemakings.249  
In contrast to the CAA’s provisions, “congressional efforts to curb the 
migration of invasive species, and of invasive carp in particular, have yet 
to reach the level of detail one sees in the air or water pollution 
schemes.”250 The court surveyed existing federal legislation on invasive 
species.251 The Seventh Circuit panel concluded that “[a]lthough this 
legislation demonstrates that Congress is aware of the problem of invasive 
species generally, and carp in particular, it falls far short” of the provisions 
of the CAA or CWA that were found to displace federal common law.252 
The court noted “neither the Corps nor any other agency has been 
empowered actively to regulate the problem of invasive carp, and 
Congress has not required any agency to establish a single standard to deal 
                                                      
244. Id.  
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 777 (quoting AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011)). 
247. Id.  
248. Id. at 777–78. 
249. Id. at 778.  
250. Id. at 778–79. 
251. Id.  
252. Id. at 780. 
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with the problem or to take any other action.”253 It also emphasized that no 
enforcement mechanism has been created by Congress that would give 
parties adversely affected by the carp recourse to the courts.254 Thus, the 
court concluded that federal common law had not been displaced.255 
While ultimately finding that it was not an abuse of discretion in the 
lower court’s decision to not issue a preliminary injunction, the court took 
issue with Judge Dow’s assessment of the risks posed by the carp.256 The 
court believed that the plaintiffs demonstrated “a good or perhaps even a 
substantial likelihood of harm—that is, a non-trivial chance that the carp 
will invade Lake Michigan in numbers great enough to constitute a public 
nuisance.”257  
The Seventh Circuit ruled that AEP did not entirely displace the federal 
common law of nuisance to address all transboundary environmental 
problems. The court upheld use of the federal common law of interstate 
nuisance to address the threat to the Great Lakes posed by invasive species 
of Asian carp.258 After holding that the concept of interstate nuisance was 
sufficiently broad to embrace the spread of invasive species, the court 
rejected claims that AEP had relaxed the test for finding displacement.259 It 
is not enough that Congress indicates its intention to delegate a particular 
problem to an executive agency, the Seventh Circuit panel stated.260 
Rather, delegation is only “one type of congressional action that is 
evidence of displacement.”261 Even though Congress had mentioned the 
invasive carp and directed that the problem be studied, the court concluded 
that congressional awareness of a problem “falls far short” of the kind of 
displacement for interstate nuisances previously found in the CWA and 
CAA.262 This represents a fair reading of the AEP decision, particularly in 
the context of an emerging environmental controversy not directly 
addressed by existing legislation. 
B. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.: The Ninth Circuit 
Applies AEP to Dismiss Cities’ Federal Common Law Climate Claims  
In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed a federal common law nuisance 
                                                      
253. Id.  
254. Id.  
255. Id. at 772. 
256. Id. at 785. 
257. Id. at 769. 
258. Id. at 772–73. 
259. Id.  
260. Id. at 777.  
261. Id. at 777–78. 
262. Id. at 780.  
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action brought against energy, oil and utility companies by the municipal 
governments of cities located on the tip of a barrier island in Alaska.263 
The cities alleged that fossil fuels produced and used by the defendants 
had contributed to climate change, that the defendants conspired to 
promote deliberate misrepresentation of climate change science, and that 
rising sea levels ultimately would require their residents to relocate.264 
They sought $400 million in damages to pay for relocation of the 
villages.265 
A federal district court in California initially dismissed the lawsuit on 
the ground that it raised a non-justiciable political question and that 
plaintiffs lacked standing.266 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that AEP 
reaffirmed that “federal common law can apply to transboundary pollution 
suits,” which most often “are founded on a theory of public nuisance.”267 
Citing AEP, the court noted that a “successful public nuisance claim 
generally requires proof that a defendant’s activity unreasonably interfered 
with the use or enjoyment of a public right and thereby caused the public-
at-large substantial and widespread harm.”268 However, the court also 
noted that “[f]ederal common law is subject to the paramount authority of 
Congress.”269  
The court then noted that deciding whether a federal statute displaces 
federal common law “can prove complicated” because “the applicability 
of displacement is an issue-specific inquiry.”270 Quoting Michigan v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, the court stated that “the salient question is 
‘whether Congress has provided a sufficient legislative solution to the 
particular [issue] to warrant a conclusion that [the] legislation has 
occupied the field to the exclusion of federal common law.’ Put more 
plainly, ‘how much congressional action is enough?’”271 But the panel 
concluded that “[w]e need not engage in that complex issue and fact-
specific analysis in this case, because we have direct Supreme Court 
guidance” from the AEP decision.272 The Court in AEP had highlighted 
that “Congress has directly addressed the issue of domestic greenhouse 
                                                      
263. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
264. Id. at 853–54. 
265. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Flooded Village Files Suit, Citing Corporate Link to Climate 
Change, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/27/us/27alaska.html. 
266. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
267. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 855. 
268. Id. (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power 
Co., 582 F. 3d 309, 357 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
269. Id. at 856. 
270. Id. at 856. 
271. Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 777 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
272. Id.  
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gas emissions from stationary sources and has therefore displaced federal 
common law.”273 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kivalina confirms that the federal 
common law of interstate nuisance has been displaced by the CAA’s 
delegation to EPA of the responsibility to control GHG emissions that 
endanger public health and welfare by contributing to climate change. The 
theory behind displacement is that Congress has required EPA, rather than 
the courts, to respond to the problem. That is scant comfort to the citizens 
of the Village of Kivalina, but it does place the onus on EPA to take action 
to deal with climate change. 
The table below reflects the current state of interstate nuisance 
claims—to include how federal courts have treated states—in light of 
Massachusetts v. EPA, AEP, and the other cases discussed above.  
 
Table 2: Summary of Interstate Nuisance Claims from Massachusetts v. 
EPA to Present 
Case Name Federal 
Common Law 
of Nuisance? 
State Common 
Law of 
Nuisance? 
“Special 
Solicitude” to 
States as 
Litigants? 
Massachusetts v. 
EPA 
Not addressed Not addressed Reaffirmed 
(quoting Georgia 
v. Tennessee 
Copper Co.) 
Native Village of 
Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil 
(2012) 
CAA displaces 
any federal 
common law 
right to seek 
abatement of 
CO2 emissions  
Not addressed Not addressed 
AEP v. 
Connecticut 
(2011) 
CAA displaces 
any federal 
common law 
right to seek 
abatement of 
CO2 emissions 
Discussed, but 
specifically 
mentioned that it 
was not 
preempted 
Reaffirmed  
Michigan v. 
United States 
Army Corps 
(2011) 
Not displaced in 
the context of 
invasive species 
Not addressed Reaffirmed 
                                                      
273. Id. 
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IV. COULD OFFICIAL CLIMATE DENIAL REVIVE THE COMMON LAW? 
After the Supreme Court’s Milwaukee II and AEP decisions, the federal 
common law of nuisance risks being dismissed as a historical curiosity. 
After all, the Court ruled in AEP that the CAA has displaced the federal 
common law of nuisance for climate change claims.274 Yet if the Trump 
administration repeals EPA’s endangerment finding or Congress amends 
the CAA to deprive EPA of authority to regulate GHG emissions, federal 
common law may no longer be displaced. Skeptics of this argument may 
assert that common law nuisance litigation remains an antiquated strategy 
that no longer has viability in the face of complex and comprehensive 
environmental laws and regulations—regardless of what administration is 
in power and what its governing policy preferences are. Yet the Court’s 
reasoning in both Milwaukee II and AEP relied heavily on the regulations 
being developed and implemented by an expert administrative agency.275 
The Court in AEP highlighted the extent to which the Court will defer to 
agency expertise.276 After all, the CAA entrusts its implementation to EPA 
which, as the Court noted, is “better equipped to the job” in light of its 
“scientific, economic, and technological resources.”277 What, then, if the 
expert agency dismisses this scientific expertise and this resource 
advantage? What level of deference should be shown by the Court? This 
Part of the Article explores the consequences of the massive 
environmental deregulatory efforts currently underway at the Trump EPA, 
which may breathe new life into this centuries-old doctrine, forcing us to 
re-conceptualize these common law claims.  
A. The Enduring Legacy of the Federal Common Law of Interstate 
Nuisance  
Transboundary pollution problems served as a principal justification for 
federalizing U.S. environmental protection law, but until recently they 
have been poorly addressed by federal regulatory programs.278 Despite 
agencies’ greater expertise in determining appropriate levels of pollution 
                                                      
274. AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
275. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 325–26 (1981); AEP, 564 U.S. at 428. 
276. AEP, 564 U.S. at 428. 
277. Id.  
278. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 932 
(1997) (“Notwithstanding the broad general trend toward centralized regulatory authority in 
environmental law, and the widespread invocation of transboundary pollution as a justification for that 
trend, little meaningful regulation of transboundary pollution actually exists.”). 
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control, political forces often have stymied agency action.279 For example, 
the CAA has long had provisions authorizing EPA to regulate 
transboundary air pollution,280 but the agency refused to use these 
authorities until President Clinton’s second term.281 This history convinces 
Professor Thomas Merrill that, “insofar as multi-jurisdictional air pollution 
problems are concerned, some type of decisive congressional intervention 
is required before effective regulatory action will be taken against the 
problem.”282  
During the long legislative gridlock over acid rain and interstate ozone 
transport problems, environmental groups tried mightily to convince the 
federal judiciary to require EPA to exercise its CAA authority to regulate 
transboundary pollution. Plaintiffs repeatedly were rebuffed. Courts cited 
the difficulty of proving interstate interference with attainment and 
maintenance of national air quality standards given the difficulty of tracing 
the transport of pollutants over long distances.283 At times they candidly 
admitted their preference for greater direction from Congress concerning 
how to resolve what were perceived as fierce regional conflicts.284 Yet the 
very political factors that made agency officials reluctant to act, including 
differential impacts on source and victim states, also made it difficult for 
Congress to legislate to resolve transboundary pollution problems.285  
                                                      
279. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, The Worst of Times: Bush’s Environmental Legacy 
Examined, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/jan/16/green 
politics-georgebush [https://perma.cc/E8JF-3WSD]. 
280. See § 110(a)(2)(D) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2016), which requires state 
implementation plans (SIPs) to contain measures to ensure that in-state emissions will not “contribute 
significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State” of any national 
ambient air quality standard (NAAQS). A downwind state may petition EPA under § 126(b), 42 
U.S.C. § 7426(b), for a finding that a major stationary source or group of sources is interfering with 
the state’s air quality in violation of § 110. If such a finding is made, the source may not operate after 
three months unless it complies with an EPA order to come into compliance within three years. § 
7426(c). 
281. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton Sharply Tightens Air Pollution Regulations Despite 
Concern over Costs, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at A1. 
282. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 
314 (2005). 
283. See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
284. In one such case, then-Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained, in a remarkably 
candid concurring opinion, why she had refused to require EPA to act:  
As counsel for the EPA acknowledged at oral argument, the EPA has taken no action against 
sources of interstate air pollution under either Section 126(b) or Section 110(a)(2)(E) in the 
decade-plus since those provisions were enacted. Congress, when it is so minded, is fully 
capable of instructing the EPA to address particular matters promptly. . . . Congress did not 
supply such direction in this instance; instead, it allowed and has left unchecked the EPA’s 
current approach to interstate air pollution. The judiciary, therefore, is not the proper place in 
which to urge alteration of the Agency’s course. 
Id. at 581 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
285. See Richard B. Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts: The Role of the Federal Courts, 6 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 243 (1982). 
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The states that today are trying to use the common law of interstate 
nuisance to prevent invasive carp from reaching the Great Lakes view 
such litigation as only one part of a much larger strategy for persuading 
government actors to intervene.286 They realize that preliminary defeats in 
litigation can lay the groundwork for future success in court.287 In 
Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the common law nuisance 
suit—while ultimately unsuccessful—may have spurred the Corps to 
release a study on invasive species.288 This study served as the basis for 
separate but important congressional action that addressed some of the 
litigants underlying concerns.289 It is likely that the threat of losing the 
common law lawsuit spurred the Corps to take action. As Michigan v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers reaffirmed the use of the federal common law 
for certain environmental actions, the threat of losing the lawsuit—not to 
mention the high costs of litigation and discovery—will continue to shine 
light on environmental issues in the face of delay or inaction. The 
converse also can be true, but such common law actions can engage the 
federal courts and Congress “as partners in an ongoing colloquy over the 
interpretation and lawfulness of statutes” with common law judgments 
functioning as “an integral part of this colloquy.”290  
                                                      
286. In response to the district court’s decision denying a preliminary injunction, Nick Schroeck 
of the Great Lakes Environmental Law Center stated:  
This fight, however, is worth having. And to the extent that Plaintiffs can increase the federal 
and state response to the crisis and expedite the completion of the hydrological separation 
study (which is the real solution to Asian carp and the next invasive species, whatever it may 
be) this case continues to have importance. For the rest of us who care about the Great Lakes, 
we must continue to press for action from the White House and Congress. As the legal battle 
over injunctions and common law public nuisance demonstrates, the current law is, at best, 
inadequate and we need comprehensive federal legislation attacking aquatic invasive species 
from all vectors. 
Noah Hall, Another Setback in the Legal Fight to Keep Asian Carp out of the Great Lakes, GREAT 
LAKES LAW (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/blog/2010/12/another-setback-in-the-legal-
fight-to-keep-asian-carp-out-of-the-great-lakes.html [https://perma.cc/N6VL-J8AT].  
287. Thomas Cmar of the Natural Resources Defense Council states:  
Judge Dow is correct that there are federal and state agencies working on this . . . most 
notably the Army Corps of Engineers. The problem is that the Army Corps is working on this 
far too slowly, and in the wrong way. Rather than lasering in on bold, effective action to 
prevent the Asian carp from establishing a population in Lake Michigan, the Corps is 
conducting a study that they think will take over 5 years and cost over $25 million—and even 
then, they have not committed to deciding on an option that will fully prevent Asian carp 
from moving through the CAWS, but only one that will “reduce the risk” of carp getting into 
the Lake. That’s far from an adequate response, and if the White House or Congress doesn’t 
step in and provide the Corps with some adult supervision, the Asian carp saga could end up 
back in court—this time on a legal issue that the Corps is less likely to win. 
Id.  
288. See Schuette Building National Coalition Against Aquatic Invasive Species, supra note 247. 
289. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 779 (7th Cir. 2011). Section 1538 
of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Public Law 112-141. 
290. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 23, at 404. 
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When the regulatory and political processes fail to prevent significant 
harm, the threat of common law litigation can be a useful catalyst for 
action by other branches of government.291 Clearly, the common law of 
interstate nuisance has other virtues apart from the well-known deterrent 
impact of tort law. Benjamin Ewing and Douglas Kysar describe the role 
of the modern common law of nuisance as part of a complex mosaic of 
“[o]verlapping governance mechanisms” that “help to span jurisdictions 
and to marshal different fact-finding competencies, remedial powers, and 
value orientations.”292 Such mechanisms help to “ensure a fuller and more 
inclusive characterization of emerging threats to social and environmental 
well-being.”293 They are part of what Ewing and Kysar describe as “prods 
and pleas,” a kind of check against institutions that fail to perform their 
assigned roles to meet societal needs.294  
In the climate change context, few people expected that an interstate 
nuisance action to address climate change ultimately would be 
successful.295 But climate litigation—discussed in greater detail below—is 
partially successful as a way to place greater pressure on companies. 
Although the Supreme Court in AEP unanimously decided that the 
federal common law of interstate nuisance was displaced by the CAA,296 
the Justices (by a 4–4 vote) rejected pleas that they permanently bar such 
litigation on constitutional (political question or standing) grounds.297 
Relying on the late Judge Henry Friendly’s 1964 Benjamin Cardozo 
Lecture on In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law,298 
Justice Ginsburg boldly declared that environmental protection is “an area 
‘within national legislative power,’ one in which federal courts may fill in 
‘statutory interstices,’ and, if necessary, even ‘fashion federal law.’”299  
Citing many of the cases discussed in Part I of this paper (Missouri v. 
Illinois, New Jersey v. City of New York, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, 
and Milwaukee I), Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court often has 
                                                      
291. But the state common law of nuisance is not without its own dangers. This action can 
include not only new laws or regulatory action to address emerging or neglected problems, but also 
laws to restrict the scope of state common law. UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-4-515 (LexisNexis 2018); see 
also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.05102 (West 2017) (insulating permitted discharges 
from nuisance liability premised on climate change). 
292. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 23, at 410. 
293. Id.  
294. Id. at 411. 
295. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 
121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 135 (2011). 
296. AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
297. Id. at 420.  
298. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 383 (1964). 
299. AEP, 564 U.S. at 421 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New 
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421–22 (1964)). 
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entertained “federal common-law suits brought by one State to abate 
pollution emanating from another State.”300 She appropriately described 
these cases as instances in which “States were permitted to sue to 
challenge activity harmful to their citizens’ health and welfare.”301 Thus, 
the AEP Court actually endorsed the notion that protection against 
interstate air and water pollution is an area where “specialized federal 
common law” makes sense. 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion sheds some light on the criteria the Court 
will use in determining whether regulatory legislation has displaced the 
federal common law of interstate nuisance. Prior to the Court’s decision, 
there had been considerable debate over the appropriate standard for 
finding displacement.302 Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in 
Milwaukee II had emphasized the comprehensive nature of the CWA’s 
prohibition of unpermitted discharges of water pollution.303 In AEP, 
Justice Ginsburg framed the test as involving whether the regulatory 
statute “speaks directly” to the emissions the plaintiffs seek to control.304 
In light of the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA that GHG 
emissions could be regulated under the CAA, EPA’s subsequent 
“endangerment finding,” and regulatory initiatives to control GHG 
emissions, the AEP Court had no trouble finding displacement of the 
federal common law.305 
The Court did not provide a specific roadmap addressing how courts 
are to determine whether a statute “speaks directly” to the transboundary 
emissions targeted by the interstate nuisance action.306 General coverage is 
probably not enough, but a Supreme Court decision like Massachusetts v. 
EPA that expressly confirms such regulatory authority and requires EPA 
to determine whether or not to exercise it, seems to qualify.307  
Further, Justice Ginsburg’s decision discussed the judiciary’s role in 
exercising judicial review over whether and how the EPA exercises this 
authority.308 She noted that “[i]f EPA does not set emissions limits for a 
particular pollutant or source of pollution, States and private parties may 
petition for a rulemaking on the matter, and EPA’s response will be 
reviewable in federal court.”309 Justice Ginsburg also notes the continual 
                                                      
300. Id.  
301. Id. at 422. 
302. See, e.g., Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 315–20 (1981). 
303. Id. at 317–19.  
304. AEP, 564 U.S. at 424. 
305. Id. 
306. Id. at 424–25. 
307. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007). 
308. AEP, 564 U.S. at 425. 
309. Id.  
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availability of citizen suits to enforce emissions limits against regulated 
sources.310 This suggests that the judiciary should continue to play an 
important oversight role. Under Justice Ginsburg’s rubric, while federal 
common law may be displaced in the CAA context for now, the judiciary 
will play a critical role to police any subsequent decisions by regulatory 
authorities to eschew regulation.  
Lastly, the Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment on the question 
of whether the CAA preempts the application of state common law in 
lawsuits involving interstate nuisance claims.311 Citing Ouellette, Justice 
Ginsburg noted that “the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, 
inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal Act.”312 Because the 
issue had not been briefed or argued in the AEP litigation, the court 
deferred judgment on this issue.313 Yet Ouellette made it clear that the 
CWA’s displacement of the federal common law of interstate nuisance did 
not displace state common law so long as the law of the source state, 
rather than the law of the downwind state, was used.314  
B. Why Official Climate Denial May Backfire and Revive the Common 
Law  
Because action by the Trump EPA to repeal EPA’s endangerment 
finding would be unlikely to survive judicial review, Congress may seek 
to deny EPA authority to regulate GHG emissions. This clearly would 
revitalize federal common law claims because Congress no longer would 
have delegated by statute responsibility to EPA to respond to the climate 
change problem.315 And there are other avenues by which the door remains 
open for common law nuisance claims in climate change litigation.  
1. A Reversal of EPA’s “Endangerment” Finding  
Even as EPA seeks to repeal its existing regulations controlling GHG 
emissions, the agency’s 2009 finding that such emissions endanger public 
health and welfare creates a legal obligation under the CAA for the agency 
to control them. If the agency seeks to avoid this obligation by reversing 
its endangerment finding, such a decision would be subject to judicial 
                                                      
310. Id. 
311. Id. at 429. 
312. Id. (citing Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489, 491 (1987)). 
313. Id. 
314. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489 (1987). 
315. At least one law has been proposed to do just that. Within the last year, the House 
considered H.R. 637, the “Stopping EPA Overreach Act of 2017,” which would exclude GHGs from 
regulation under the CAA. H.R. 637, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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review.316 In his testimony before the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee on January 30, 2018, then-EPA administrator Scott 
Pruitt stated that he would not rule out commencing a rulemaking to 
reverse the endangerment finding.317 If the agency ultimately reverses the 
endangerment finding, the courts would closely scrutinize such a decision, 
as Justice Ginsburg took care to highlight in AEP.318  
In light of the overwhelming scientific evidence supporting EPA’s 
endangerment finding, any reversal would be unlikely to survive judicial 
review. This may explain the Trump Administration’s hesitance to pursue 
such an action, despite its aggressive moves to repeal GHG emissions 
regulations. Justice Ginsburg’s strong language in AEP suggests that the 
rationale for federal common law displacement is founded in part on the 
notion that the judiciary will be available to police irrational action by the 
expert agency charged by law with protecting the public against air 
pollutants that endanger public health or welfare.  
When another administration bent on deregulation assumed office in 
1981, it immediately sought to rescind a regulation requiring passive 
restraints on motor vehicles. But the Supreme Court in its famous State 
Farm decision held that this action was arbitrary and capricious because 
the rulemaking record overwhelmingly demonstrated the life-saving 
benefits of air bags.319 Because of this decision, the regulation ultimately 
went into effect and hundreds of thousands of lives have been saved and 
millions of serious injuries have been prevented.320 The lesson of this 
history is that a new administration must have a sound factual and legal 
basis for changing course or it risks having its actions overturned in court. 
While agencies are often afforded great discretion regardless of the 
political administration, agency decisions are not “unimpeachable.”321 
Indeed, State Farm affirmed that efforts to promote the underlying policy 
preferences of a new administration only go so far.322 The Court will use 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard if the 
agency cannot articulate a satisfactory explanation for a dramatic change 
in course.323 In the context of future climate litigation, the CAA delegates 
great discretion to the EPA as the expert agency to regulate greenhouse 
                                                      
316. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
317. DiChristopher, supra note 18. 
318. See, e.g., Tom DiChristopher, Climate Change Deniers Are Plotting Trump’s Path to the 
Holy Grail of Deregulation, CNBC (Nov. 22, 2017 11:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/22/cli 
mate-change-deniers-plot-trumps-path-to-deregulation.html [https://perma.cc/5JDV-7473]. 
319. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
320. The full story is told in MICHAEL R. LEMOV, CAR SAFETY WARS: ONE HUNDRED YEARS 
OF TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND DEATH 147–74 (2015). 
321. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50.  
322. Id. at 50–51. 
323. Id. at 46–47.  
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gas emissions.324 Nevertheless, the EPA must follow the rulemaking 
process for the promulgation and recession of applicable rules concerning 
air pollutants to include GHGs. State Farm instructs us that failure to 
establish a legal and factual record to support agency action will make it 
vulnerable to reversal under the APA. 
In the unlikely event that a reversal of the endangerment finding was 
upheld in court, would the federal common law of nuisance still be 
displaced? The AEP Court expressly disagreed with the argument “that 
federal common law is not displaced until EPA actually exercises its 
regulatory authority, i.e., until it sets standards governing emissions from 
the defendants’ plants.”325 Instead, it concluded that:  
The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision 
whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from 
powerplants; the delegation is what displaces federal common law. 
Indeed, were EPA to decline to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions 
altogether at the conclusion of its ongoing § 7411 rulemaking, the 
federal courts would have no warrant to employ the federal 
common law of nuisance to upset the Agency’s expert 
determination.326 
This indicates clearly that if reversal of an endangerment finding were 
upheld in court, federal common law still would be displaced. But the 
reason for this displacement would be because an expert agency had made 
a decision that reviewing courts found to be supported by facts and law. 
Thus, only if GHG emissions in fact do not endanger public health or 
welfare can a reversal of the endangerment finding preclude common law 
litigation. 
2. If Congress Amends the Clean Air Act to Reverse Massachusetts v. 
EPA, Federal Common Law Would Be Revived 
If congressional proposals to amend the CAA to deprive EPA of its 
authority to regulate GHG emissions prove successful, the core rationale 
for displacement of federal common law will disappear entirely. Indeed, 
the legal landscape would be fundamentally changed if the EPA was 
stripped of such authority—and there have been calls to do just that. For 
example, House Bill 637, “Stopping EPA Overreach Act of 2017,” “would 
                                                      
324. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
325. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 425–26 (2011). 
326. Id. at 426. 
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exclude GHGs from regulation under the [CAA].”327 If this proposed 
legislation or similar legislation becomes law, federal common law 
nuisance claims brought by states in the fight to reduce GHG emissions 
clearly would become legally viable once again. No longer would the 
CAA, in the words of AEP, “delegate[] to EPA the decision whether and 
how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from powerplants.”328 Thus, 
states would be free to sue the owners of such power plants using federal 
common law nuisance claims. 
3. State Common Law Nuisance Claims Remain Viable 
Because AEP did not address state common law nuisance claims, the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Ouellette remains good law. Thus, state 
common law nuisance claims remain a possible pathway for future climate 
change litigation provided that the law of the source state is applied.329 
While it may seem strange to apply the common law of source states to a 
global problem, there is little actual variance in the law from state to state. 
In Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 1,500 individuals who live 
within a mile of a coal-fired power plant in Pennsylvania filed a class 
action private nuisance action against the facility.330 They asserted several 
state law tort theories, but the defendant Plant countered that because it 
already “was subject to comprehensive regulation under the [CAA] it 
owed no extra duty of care to the members of the Class under state tort 
law.”331  
Based on the savings clause and the plain language of the CAA, the 
Third Circuit ruled that the CAA did not preempt source state common 
law tort actions.332 In doing so, the court relied heavily on Ouellette’s 
reasoning and the Court’s reliance on the CWA’s savings clause that 
allowed states to impose higher standards on their own point sources.333 
The defendant power plant in Bell argued that the CAA’s savings clause 
did not address boundary rights and was narrower than and distinguishable 
from that found in the CWA.334 But the court was unconvinced, 
                                                      
327. H.R. 637, 115th Cong. (2017); LINDA TSANG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44807, U.S. 
CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION AND LITIGATION: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 38 (2017). 
328. 564 U.S. at 426. 
329. Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 196–97 (3d Cir. 2013). 
330. Id. at 189. 
331. Id.  
332. Id. at 190. 
333. Id. at 194–95. The CAA citizen suit “savings clause” states, “Nothing in this section shall 
restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to 
seek enforcement of any emission standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief 
against the Administrator or a State agency).” 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2012). 
334. Bell, 734 F.3d at 195.  
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highlighting that the absence of boundary language in the CAA’s savings 
clause merely indicates that “there are no such jurisdictional boundaries 
or rights which apply to the air.”335 If anything, Congress intended to 
preserve more rights for the states.  
Although Bell v. Cheswick was a private nuisance action that did not 
involve interstate pollution, it has relevance for future climate change 
litigation. It reaffirms the logic in earlier cases that courts will not assume 
that the powers of the state are preempted by a federal act “unless that was 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”336 
In Ouellette the Supreme Court explained that the application of the 
common law of the source state would alleviate concerns that state 
common law actions would interfere with the federal regulatory 
infrastructure.337 However, in North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority, the Fourth Circuit suggested that compliance with 
federal CAA regulations should insulate power plants from any state tort 
action that seeks to impose “different” standards than the regulatory 
scheme.338 In the North Carolina case a federal district judge had ordered 
upwind, out-of-state coal-fired power plants to reduce their emissions 
because they were causing a public nuisance.339 This decision was 
reversed on appeal by the Fourth Circuit, which noted that the plants were 
not violating existing CAA regulations.340  
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s decision 
improperly applied home state law extraterritorially, though this is 
questionable given that there are not substantial differences in the common 
law from state to state.341 While the court was careful not to contradict 
Ouellette, acknowledging that “only source state law . . . could impose 
more stringent emissions rates than those required by federal law,”342 it did 
not specify how the nuisance law of the source states was any less 
stringent than North Carolina’s own legislation.343  
                                                      
335. Id. See also Scott Gallisdorfer, Note, Clean Air Act Preemption of State Common Law: 
Greenhouse Gas Nuisance Claims After AEP v. Connecticut, 99 VA. L. REV. 131, 150 (2013) (stating 
that “the two statutes feature nearly identical savings clauses and employ similar ‘cooperative 
federalism’ structures”). 
336. Bell, 734 F.3d at 198 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). 
337. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 495–96 (1987). “An action brought against IPC 
under New York [source state] nuisance law would not frustrate the goals of the CWA as would a suit 
governed by Vermont [affected state] law.” Id. at 498. 
338. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 303 (4th Cir. 2010). 
339. Id. at 296–97. 
340. Id. at 300. 
341. Id. at 306–07. 
342. Id. at 308. 
343. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.107D (2018). See North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority, 593 F.Supp. 2d 812, 829–31 (discussion of the common law of nuisance in 
Alabama, Kentucky and Tennessee). 
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The Supreme Court in Ouellette endorsed application of source state 
common law precisely because these concerns about inconsistent 
regulation do not apply when such law is used.344 The Court recognized a 
“regulatory partnership” between the federal government and the source 
state due to the role envisioned for the source state within the CWA.345 
Like the CAA, the CWA establishes source state permitting systems and 
allows states to impose stricter standards than those required by federal 
law without undermining the federal-state regulatory partnership.346 Thus, 
the Court held an action brought under source state law “would not 
frustrate the goals of the CWA”347 because it did not upset the balance 
among the interests of the federal government, the source state, and the 
affected state, and because it restricted the number of “indeterminate . . . 
potential regulations” to only a single additional authority.348 The Fourth 
Circuit correctly noted that Ouellette did not foreclose all state tort 
actions,349 yet it failed to recognize the Court’s nuanced distinction 
between affected and source state actions when it concluded that Ouellette 
supported its contention that due to their “considerable potential mischief . 
. . the strongest cautionary presumption” should apply against state 
nuisance actions.350 
                                                      
344. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 498–99 (1987).  
345. Id. at 490–91, 499.  
346. The Court pointed to its earlier decisions holding that when imposing stricter limitation 
standards authorized under the CWA, a source state may do so by either state statute or nuisance law. 
Id. at 497.  
347. Id. at 498. 
348. Id. at 499.  
349. See North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth, 615 F.3d 291, 303 (4th Cir. 2010). 
(“The Ouellette Court itself explicitly refrained from categorically preempting every nuisance action 
brought under source state law.”).  
350. Id. Although Ouellette dealt only with the CWA, and not the CAA, many lower courts have 
indicated that this would not make a difference. See, e.g., Technical Rubber Co. v. Buckeye Egg Farm, 
L.P., No. 2:99-CV-1413, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8602, at *15–16 (S.D. Ohio June 16, 2000) (quoting 
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 343 (6th 
Cir. 1989)) (holding the CAA did not preempt plaintiff’s source state nuisance claims, citing Ouellette 
and explaining, “there was no reason to think that the result with regard to air pollution” and the CAA 
should be any different); Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp, 798 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (W.D. Tex. 1992) 
(similar holding and finding that “Congress did not intend to preempt state authority” with respect to 
the CAA). See also People ex rel. Madigan v. PSI Energy, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 514, 517–18 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s nuisance claims because they were brought under the law of Illinois, as 
opposed to the source state law of Indiana). Cf. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Province of Ontario 
v. Detroit, 874 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding the CAA did not preempt plaintiff’s suit under state 
statutory law, the Michigan Environmental Protection Act). But see Clean Air Mkts. Grp. v. Pataki, 
338 F.3d 82, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding New York’s cap and trade emissions program preempted 
by the CAA because its placement of restrictions on upwind transfers directly contradicted Congress’s 
mandate that this type of state program could not restrict allowance trading). These courts recognize 
that Ouellette distinguished between state common law actions that remained viable because they 
applied the law of the source state and those that did not. See, e.g., Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare 
Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Ouellette for the proposition that “although the 
Clean Water Act preempts nuisance actions under state law against out-of-state sources, it does not 
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When it declared that any state tort action seeking to establish standards 
“different” from the state or federal scheme deserves the “strongest 
cautionary presumption” against it,351 the Fourth Circuit ignored the 
Supreme Court’s directive in Ouellette “not [to] lightly infer pre-
emption.”352 Although the Fourth Circuit was careful not to “state 
categorically . . . a flat-out preemption” rule, its “strongest cautionary 
presumption” language encourages trial courts to characterize all state tort 
actions involving air pollution, regardless of whether applying the 
common law of an affected or source state, as inherently suspect.353 This 
imposes a much higher burden on plaintiffs than the Supreme Court ever 
intended.  
If compliance with existing regulations is a complete defense to a 
common law nuisance action, this would remove the ability of the 
common law to serve its traditional role as a backstop to redress harm that 
is not adequately prevented by regulation. Ever since a British court in 
1862 in Bamford v. Turnley overruled Hole v. Barlow, it has been 
recognized that the mere fact that a source or activity is not violating 
existing regulations should not be a defense to nuisance liability.354 
In Milwaukee II the Court explained that the standard for inferring 
displacement of “federal common law is not the same as that employed in 
deciding if federal law pre-empts state law.”355 The latter, because it 
involves superseding the “historic police powers of the States” should not 
be inferred without a determination that it “was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress” to do so.356 Federalism concerns are not implicated 
in assessing displacement of federal common law, the Court explained, 
because in such cases “we start with the assumption that it is for Congress, 
not federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a 
matter of federal law.”357 Thus, despite the concerns expressed in AEP 
about judicial competence to decide complex transboundary nuisance 
cases, it remains difficult to find preemption of source state common law, 
particularly in light of the savings clauses contained in the federal 
environmental statutes.358 Several cities, counties and states have filed 
                                                                                                                         
preempt such actions against in-state polluters”); Technical Rubber Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8602, 
at *15–16 (recognizing that Ouellette preempted only affected state tort actions, but permitted source 
state tort actions). 
351. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper, 615 F.3d at 303.  
352. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 491. 
353. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper, 615 F.3d at 303. 
354. Bamford v. Turnley (1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 30 (overruling Hole v Barlow (1858) 140 
Eng. Rep. 1113, 4 C.B.N.S. 334). 
355. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981). 
356. Id. (quoting Jones v Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). 
357. Id. at 317 (footnote omitted). 
358. One must be cautious about making predictions concerning preemption particularly in light 
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common law nuisance suits against oil companies, seeking remedies in the 
face of damage wrought by climate change as part of a broader climate 
change litigation strategy.359 In March 2018 Federal District Judge Vince 
Chhabria rejected an effort by oil companies to remove to federal court a 
state nuisance law climate suit brought by San Mateo and Marin counties 
and the city of Imperial Beach, California.360 Judge Chhabria ruled that the 
cases were properly brought in California state court.361 On June 25, 2018, 
Federal District Judge William Alsup dismissed a similar climate nuisance 
suit filed by the cities of Oakland and San Francisco.362 After holding a 
“science tutorial” on climate change, Judge Alsup concluded that the 
dispute “is not over science.”363 He observed, “All parties agree that fossil 
fuels have led to global warming and ocean rise and will continue to do so, 
and that eventually the navigable waters of the United States will intrude 
upon Oakland and San Francisco.”364 Judge Alsup noted that if the lawsuit 
only pertained to GHG emissions within the U.S., it would be displaced by 
AEP and Kivalina.365 But because it also involved emissions caused by the 
defendants’ product sold outside the U.S., he did not find displacement.366 
Instead he concluded that the lawsuits “are foreclosed by the need for 
federal courts to defer to the legislative and executive branches when it 
comes to such international problems . . . .”367 
On July 19, 2018, Federal District Judge John F. Keenan dismissed the 
city of New York’s common law nuisance suit against BP, Chevron, 
Conoco Phillips, ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch Shell for fossil fuel 
production that contributes to climate change.368 Citing AEP, the judge 
held that the CAA displaces the federal common law of nuisance because 
                                                                                                                         
of the tug-of-war over preemption in state products liability cases involving pharmaceuticals, Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), medical devices, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), and 
highway safety standards, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). See Lisa Heinzerling, 
Climate, Preemption, and the Executive Branches, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2008) (questioning whether 
federal preemption will be invoked in the future to block more stringent state laws to control emissions 
of GHGs). 
359. One commentator asserted that the fossil fuel industry’s “tobacco moment” has arrived. 
Douglas Kysar, Fossil Fuel Industry’s ‘Tobacco Moment’ Has Arrived, LAW360 (Jul. 28, 2017), https: 
//www.law360.com/california/articles/948361. 
360. County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
361. Id. at 937. 
362. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 3109726, at *3, *9 (N.D. 
Cal. June 25, 2018). 
363. Id. at *3–4. 
364. Id. at *4. 
365. Id. at *6. 
366. Id. 
367. Id.  
368. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 18 Civ. 182 (JFK), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120934 
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2018). 
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it gives EPA responsibility to regulate emissions of GHGs.369 Responding 
to the city’s state law nuisance claim, Judge Keenan distinguished the case 
from AEP, which refused to decide whether the CAA displaces state law 
nuisance claims.370 Because New York City’s case involved the use of 
fossil fuels sold worldwide, rather than emissions from specific power 
plants as in AEP, the judge held that state nuisance law could not be used 
because a single federal standard should apply.371 
As discussed below, innovative climate litigation has been filed in 
several other states.372 Although it remains to be seen how successful these 
lawsuits will be, they reflect an increased willingness by state and local 
governments to address the multifaceted problems caused by climate 
change through common law nuisance litigation.  
4. Other Avenues for Climate Change Litigation  
Finally, common law claims brought under legal theories other than 
nuisance law, such as the public trust doctrine, have added yet another new 
dimension to climate change litigation. For example, in the highly reported 
and closely watched “Children’s Crusade” case, twenty-one individuals 
(all under twenty years of age) have sued the United States to compel the 
reduction of CO2 emissions.
373 In Juliana v. United States, the litigants are 
alleging (1) violations of substantive due process rights to life, liberty and 
property and (2) common law violations of the public trust doctrine.374 
While this litigation is in the early stages, it represents another effort to 
use the common law—in this case the public trust doctrine—to safeguard 
the environment for future generations.375  
                                                      
369. Id. at *14. 
370. Id. at *19. 
371. Id. at *19–20. 
372. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Young People are Suing the Trump Administration over Climate 
Change. She’s Their Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2018) available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
10/23/climate/kids-climate-lawsuit-lawyer.html. See Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, U.S. 
Litigation Database, U.S. Climate Change Litigation, http://climatecasechart.com/case-category/enviro 
nmentalist-lawsuits-state-law-claims/. 
373. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016). 
374. Id. at 1233. 
375. The public trust doctrine is a common law principle with ancient origins whereby the 
government has a duty to safeguard certain natural resources for the benefit of the public. The 
plaintiffs in Juliana seek a declaration that their rights have been violated and an order requiring 
federal officials to develop a plan to control emissions of GHGs. The court rejected the government’s 
argument that the case raises a non-justiciable political question and has allowed discovery to proceed. 
Id. at 1241–42. The Justice Department asked both the Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court to 
issue a writ of mandamus to halt discovery and a subsequent trial. After the Ninth Circuit denied the 
motion, In re United States, 884 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2018), the Supreme Court on July 30, 2018, also 
denied relief, United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., No. 18A65, 2018 WL 3615551 (U.S. 
July 30, 2018). In an unsigned order the Court called the government’s request for relief “premature.” 
Id. However, the Court cautioned that the “breadth of respondents’ claims is striking,” and it opined 
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Using constitutional and tort theories, courts in Pakistan and the 
Netherlands have ordered the government to take more aggressive action 
to control GHG emissions. In September 2015 the Lahore High Court 
Green Bench found that the Pakistani Government’s failure to implement 
the National Climate Change Policy of 2012 and the Framework for 
Implementation of Climate Change Policy during the 2014–30 period 
“offends the fundamental rights of the citizens which need to be 
safeguarded.”376 Invoking the right to life and the right to dignity in 
Pakistan’s Constitution, the court ordered government ministries and 
departments to prepare a list of adaptation measures and to implement 
Pakistan’s National Climate Change Policy. It established a Climate 
Change Commission to help it monitor their progress.377 
In the Netherlands the Urgenda Foundation, a Dutch environmental 
group, joined by nearly nine hundred Dutch citizens, sued the federal 
government for its adoption of GHG reduction goals that allegedly 
violated the government’s constitutional duty of care to protect them.378 In 
June 2015 a Dutch district court in The Hague cited the European 
Convention on Human Rights and tort law theories to order the Dutch 
government to take stronger measures to respond to climate change.379 The 
court mandated that the Dutch government reduce emissions of GHGs by 
twenty-five percent below 1990 levels by the year 2020.380 The court 
concluded that the government’s previous seventeen percent reduction 
goal was inadequate to meet the nation’s fair share of the emissions 
reductions required to protect its citizens.  
CONCLUSION 
Congress first enacted comprehensive federal regulatory programs to 
protect the environment in the early 1970s. Prior to the enactment of such 
programs, the common law of nuisance was the primary legal vehicle for 
redressing pollution problems. Early in the twentieth century, states 
invoked the federal common law of nuisance to seek intervention by the 
                                                                                                                         
that “the justiciability of those claims presents substantial grounds for difference of opinion.” Id. The 
Court’s order cautioned the federal district court hearing the case to “take these concerns into account 
in assessing the burdens of discovery and trial, as well as the desirability of a prompt ruling on 
the Government’s pending dispositive motions.” Id. On October 19, 2018 Chief Justice Roberts issued 
a temporary stay of discovery and the trial. In re United States, et al., No. 18A410, https://www.supre 
mecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/101918zr1_086c.pdf. 
376. Ashgar Leghari v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (Sept. 4, 2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Lahore High 
Ct.). 
377. Id. 
378. Urgenda Found. v. Kingdom of the Netherlands (Rb. Haag 2015). 
379. Id.  
380. Id. The Dutch government is appealing this decision. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss3/1
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U.S. Supreme Court in disputes over transboundary air and water 
pollution. The Court, exercising its original jurisdiction over disputes 
between states, heard several interstate nuisance cases and used its 
equitable powers to stop environmentally destructive actions.  
After more than a century of evolution, the federal common law of 
interstate nuisance has been largely eclipsed by the rise of the regulatory 
state. The Court has held that the CAA and CWA displace federal 
common law for pollution problems they comprehensively regulate. But 
for emerging problems not covered by existing regulatory programs, like 
invasive species, the federal common law may remain a viable option. 
In AEP the Court held that federal common law nuisance actions to 
redress climate change had been displaced by the CAA in light of its 
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA that the Act delegated to EPA the 
responsibility to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.381 But the Court 
reaffirmed the standing of states to sue, rejected the notion such lawsuits 
raise non-justiciable political questions, and left open the door to state 
common law nuisance actions to redress climate change.382 Principles of 
federalism and the extensive savings clauses in the federal environmental 
laws will make it difficult to preempt the state common law of nuisance. 
Thus, if a state can show that its residents are suffering significant injury 
that federal regulatory authorities have failed to prevent and for which an 
express decision to preempt state law has not been made, state common 
law actions founded on the law of the source state will remain available.  
In AEP, the Court reaffirmed that environmental protection was a 
proper subject for the development of federal common law.383 It also 
emphasized that expert administrative agencies generally are more capable 
than the judiciary at fashioning solutions for complex environmental 
problems.384 Yet the judiciary has played an important role as a catalyst for 
action when activities causing significant harm otherwise have escaped 
regulation. Direct judicial intervention to stop interstate pollution is rare 
today, but when regulation fails, common law remedies can serve as an 
important backstop. The Trump Administration’s aggressive efforts to 
dismantle regulation of GHG emissions and to deny the reality of climate 
change could revive federal common law,385 particularly if EPA reverses 
                                                      
381. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011). 
382. Id. at 420. 
383. Id. at 421 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common 
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421–22 (1964)). 
384. Id. at 424. 
385. Fear of reviving federal common law nuisance suits reportedly was a factor in industry 
lawyers praising the Trump Administration for proposing new, albeit much weaker, regulations of 
GHG emissions to replace the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan. Ellen M. Gilmer, Proposed 
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its endangerment finding or Congress overrules Massachusetts v. EPA.  
Judicial intervention to stop interstate pollution remains rare, but the 
common law of interstate nuisance still retains vitality as a backstop when 
regulation fails to respond to a serious problem.386 And this is particularly 
true when states sue. Moreover, in light of the judiciary’s historic role in 
responding when the other branches of government fail to address 
significant environmental harm, the common law may return as a viable 
catalyst for change if official climate denial persists.387 
The Court in AEP was surely correct that administrative agencies like 
EPA possess greater expertise than the judiciary in fashioning responses to 
climate change. This is why Congress has assigned EPA the primary 
responsibility for protecting the public against pollutants that endanger 
public health or welfare. But displacement of federal common law is not a 
license to deny or ignore a global environmental crisis. If EPA becomes 
the captive of official climate change denial, common law litigation may 
return to its historic role as an important catalyst for action. 
 
                                                                                                                         
Climate Rule May Help Hamstring Nuisance Claims, E&E NEWS, (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.eene 
ws.net/stories/1060095165/print [https://perma.cc/XZE6-HBP6]. 
386. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 23.  
387. Indeed, despite the environmental litigants’ defeat in the Fourth Circuit in North Carolina. 
ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the threat of future litigation brought the parties to the 
negotiating table, resulting in significant decreases in air pollution. See supra Part III. 
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